In nations emerging from years of conflict, the discharge, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of children associated with fighting forces (CAFF) is more than a mere stabilization measure. Child DDR also serves to reconnect former child soldiers with their families and communities, to rehabilitate individual lives and to reweave the social fabric as a positive foundation for the future. To succeed, the specific components of child DDR must be executed in a timely and coordinated fashion. This is very difficult to ensure in such a complicated a working environment as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
In the DRC, the Multi-Country Trust Fund provided funding, under the auspices of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), for four child-focused Special Projects. Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) was contracted to conduct an external evaluation of these projects. The following report provides the findings of the evaluation and complements a power point presentation provided by the team to stakeholders in Kinshasa upon the conclusion of the fieldwork.
Within the two-year timeframe envisioned by the Congolese government’s Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Program (EDRP), the four projects evaluated here have achieved the following results, as of March 2006:
Together, the four projects targeted 20,291 children for demobilization and reintegration over two years. The number of children who have completed the entire process is a mere 604, according to data provided by participating agencies (with the exception of UNICEF, who provided none). It is disconcerting that the social, educational and economic reintegration of children has only barely begun, due to operational delays and planning problems.
A mix of internal and external constraints is to blame for this performance shortfall. Some problems lie beyond the scope of the implementing agencies: conflict, political uncertainty, a deeply fractured socio-cultural sphere, a barren national economy, and a national infrastructure in ruins. But the primary factor is the delay to implement reintegration activities for reunified children. Many agencies did not prepare sufficiently for the remote working conditions in five of the seven provinces of operation: lack of physical access, high costs of air transport and the absence of reliable infrastructure all conspired to delay project start-up. Many project activities remain confined to urban areas. Follow-up supervision in rural areas is scant.
Evaluation findings combine output or process indicators and the performance of ongoing demobilization and reintegration activities for the 21,827 children at various stages within the program, as of March 2006. No children who had completed the entire process were visited; the majority of reunified children met were still waiting for their reintegration activities to begin and had received little agency follow-up. Apart from the low number of children having completed the DDR process in the two year period, the demobilization and reunification components of the children’s program have been executed in a satisfactory manner. An urgent focus is now needed on accelerating the much-delayed reintegration activities, particularly in rural areas. Donors should not consider the chapter of Congolese child soldiers closed. Many needs remain regarding their transition to productive civilian lives in their home communities.
The problem of re-recruitment continues, against which every agency struggles. It is an ongoing battle between agencies implementing reintegration activities and the armed groups who seek to re-recruit them. It is difficult to offer viable alternatives to military life given the country’s current economic climate, especially in the countryside. Serious delays in the reintegration component only increase the vulnerability of demobilized and reunified children: they are left without constructive activity and are an added burden on family. The likelihood of voluntary re-enrollment in armed groups or a slide into delinquency is high given the pressures of daily survival.Section I of the report is the introduction. Section II provides background on the special projects generally and in the DRC in particular, including those supporting assistance to child soldiers. It also presents analysis and findings focused on the performance of MDRP supported child soldiers programs in the DRC as well as associated results to date. Section III focuses on lessons and best practices with an emphasis on improving efficacy of this and other such programs. Conclusions and recommendations are summarized in Section IV in what is the final chapter of the report.
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