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Reviewing Ten Years of the School Nutrition Programme[i]

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The provision of basic education in favourable social and economic circumstances is a complex matter. This degree of complexity is increased when basic education must be delivered to individuals who struggle with the additional burden of poverty. Poverty means that many young children are food-deprived and would therefore not be able to participate fully in their own educational development. This is the context of the school nutrition programme, which spans the entire duration of the post-1994 political and educational landscape. Since its inception, the school nutrition programme operated as an in-kind transfer or benefit that was available to the poorest primary school learners. Earlier studies of this programme argued strongly for the involvement of local communities in the delivery of school feeding to children. It was argued that an exclusive focus on government-sponsored delivery mechanisms would stifle the development of nutrition-conscious communities and reduce the effectiveness of spending on this programme. Despite the urgency of such calls, the school nutrition programme has not yet spawned broad community participation that would transform it from an exclusively school feeding programme to a more comprehensive nutrition programme.

South African researchers are divided about the policy value of the school nutrition programme in its past and present guises. There are roughly speaking two "camps": those who would like to limit the scope and size of the school nutrition programme and those who would like to see an expanded programme. The former regard the school nutrition programme as an exclusively feeding programme with insufficient fiscal space for other vital aspects of an integrated nutrition strategy. This lack of balance between school feeding and broader socio-medical interventions is argued to reduce the overall effectiveness of the school nutrition programme. The solution would therefore lie in the containment of school feeding through narrower targeting and a corresponding up-scaling of socio-medical interventions such as de-worming and the delivery of micronutrients. There are also positions for the containment of the school nutrition programme because it is argued that this programme represents an inadequate embodiment of children's rights to basic food. This view argues that the right to basic food must be located elsewhere and supports the restriction of the programme to smaller numbers of beneficiaries. Those who argue for the expansion of the school nutrition programme indicate that as long as the present poverty and unemployment

conditions prevail, school feeding would remain necessary. Although there has been no actual demonstration of the cost-effectiveness and cost-efficiency of school feeding, researchers believe that programmes that have preventative value should be supported, irrespective of the costs. Cabinet's support for the expansion of the school nutrition programme appears to have settled this debate in favour of those who desire further growth and expansion. We argue that the continued absence of an appropriate balance between school feeding and other nutritional considerations places the school nutrition programme in the same domain as other policies that aim to improve the conditions of poor learners. This would de-legitimise narrow targeting and strengthen arguments for the expansion of the school nutrition programme.

Tremendous changes accompanied the evolution of the school nutrition programme from a Presidential Lead Project in 1994 to a stand-alone conditional grant administered by the Department of Education in 2004. The school nutrition programme's first budget and fiscal context was the period immediately after 1994 when government actively combated run-away consumption expenditure. The erstwhile nationalist government was unable to stem the tide of excessive government consumption expenditure in spite of policy attempts through the *White Paper on Privatisation and Deregulation in the Republic of South Africa 1987*. Thus, while the post-1994 government had to confront the task of development and re-distribution, it defined the stabilisation of broader macro-economic aggregates as a vital pre-condition for the former. Both the developmental impetus and the macro-economic imperatives were defined in the *White Paper on Reconstruction and Development 1994*. So while a school nutrition programme was established that would target poor primary school learners, the costs of delivering this programme in provinces had to avoid an escalation of overall debt and further government consumption expenditure burdens. This was achieved through the non-expansion of staff levels for designated RDP projects and budget allocations that did not keep pace with inflation. We find in this period the roots of the present conditional grant framework, which still does not conceptualise adequate staff as a necessary pre-condition for the effective and efficient implementation of grant funding.

The RDP funds that financed designated projects consisted of international donor aid as well as funds that were creamed off departmental budgets. Departments could in theory access these resources but had to re-prioritise expenditure in line with government's overall goals. Amidst widespread concern about the lack of re-prioritisation and the realisation that departments used RDP funding to avoid re-prioritisation, the RDP Office was closed in 1996. RDP projects were integrated under the relevant departments and this meant that the next destination for the primary school nutrition programme was the Department of Health. This arrangement was effective from 1998/99 until the end of 2003/04, after which the Department of Education took over responsibility for this programme. Two distinct periods in the evolution of public finances in South Africa are contained during this period, namely the austere 1996-2000 Gear period and the upswing in government expenditure after 2000. The evidence that we present in this paper suggests that while consolidated health spending received a shot in the arm after 2000, the school nutrition grant suffered large real declines in the pre-2000 period and in the post-2000 period. This meant that since the inception of the programme in 1994, it did not experience real positive growth over an eight-year period, raising serious questions about the political and policy prioritisation of this programme. However, while real budgeted allocations were still in reverse, more consistent actual spending took place since 2002. Two explanations can be used to account for improved actual spending ratios, namely greater experience with this grant given its eight-year history, and/or possibly the first fruits of reforms to the conditional grant framework. By the time the Department of Education was ready to assume chief responsibility for the school nutrition programme, the latter appeared to have halted its highly variable spending record and the conditions for the implementation of grant funding were more favourable. However, real declines in budgeted allocations had not been reversed.

What budget and fiscal context dominated provincial education funding when the school nutrition programme was transferred to the education sector in 2004? Provincial education funding after 2000 prioritised small expenditure categories. In fact, the entire redress agenda after 2000 is driven by items and expenditure categories that comprise a relatively small part of budgets. The insertion of the school nutrition programme into this context conforms to this trend and the school nutrition programme therefore joins in the post-2000 provincial education funding growth. This is indeed the case because the school nutrition programme is projected to grow at a real average annual rate of 6.4 per cent. Apart from real growth in 2003, this represents the only sustained real positive growth rate since the inception of the school nutrition programme in 1994. This real growth was made possible by Cabinet's explicit commitment to expanding this programme and revisions to the beneficiary databases in 2004 and 2005. Another important policy context that may still affect the school nutrition programme is the Department of Education's planned changes to the definition of poor learners across provinces. While such plans are not yet reality, we speculated that implementation would affect poor and rich provinces in different ways. We argue that poor provinces would have a sizeable number of poor learners in the poorest categories/quintiles, thus reducing flexibility in extending this programme to poor secondary schools. In the case of richer provinces, a relatively smaller number of poor learners would be located in the poorest quintiles, thus increasing the probability of delivering to select poor secondary schools. These speculations point to the difficulty of re-orienting the school nutrition policy from a grade level focus to a comprehensive anti-poverty focus, irrespective of grade level. The absence of discretionary funding bases in most provinces further encourages the view that the school nutrition programme's implementation would follow a forked logic, so evident in all other funding polices at provincial education level.

In our review of the efficiency and effectiveness of spending, we identified a number of factors that reduced the overall effectiveness of spending. Both poor funding prioritisation and weak actual spending ratios contributed to the reduction of effectiveness in spending. We argued against an interpretation that suggests that funding declines were the result of better targeting or efficiency gains. Our review of the targeting practices of the provincial health departments and provincial education departments brought to the fore the existence of dual targeting of the same institutions. After 2000, both the school funding norms (education) and provincial health targeting strategies (nutrition) aimed at identifying the poorest primary schools. In such a scenario, the ideal would be a situation where a poor school that receives affirmation through the school funding norms (by being placed in the poorest quintiles) would also be on the school nutrition beneficiary list. Revisions to beneficiary databases by provincial education departments in 2004 and 2005 suggest that these two targeting systems may not have always identified the same schools. This represents a weakening of the impact of anti-poverty programmes because of poor co-ordination across departments.

Evidence for the weak funding prioritisation of the school nutrition programme is also found in the participating number of schools and learners. Given the constant presence of poverty and the fact that the school nutrition programme never made space for other components of an integrated and comprehensive nutrition strategy, declines in school and learner numbers reflected the tight fiscal margins of this programme. During the period 1995 to 2003, the number of participating schools was reduced by 15.4 per cent, while learner numbers were reduced by 29.0 per cent. After 2000, the number of participating schools was increased from 16 200 in 2000/01 to 17 000 in 2003/04. This slow, but necessary increase after 2000, does not match the extent of the reductions that took place in the 1995 to 2000 period. Similarly, targeted learner numbers also experienced a decline from a "high" of 6.8 million in 1995/96 to 4.8 million in 2003/04. This represents a 29.0 per cent decline, and if we couple this to variable targeting success, then the true impact of the school nutrition programme is further shrunk. Learner numbers are rising because the data for 2004/05 show that 7.0 per cent more learners actually participated in the school nutrition programme than originally planned. This is directly related to the inefficiencies in targeting that we pointed out earlier and the directive

from the Department of Education that no participating school be removed from the beneficiary lists.

What are the main challenges concerning the implementation of the school nutrition programme? The re-orientation of the school nutrition programme from its historical grade level focus (the old PSNP) towards an explicit affirmation as an anti-poverty measure is arguably the greatest challenge. To achieve this requires clear policy and practical guidelines on the identification of the main beneficiaries. This represents the intersection of the school funding norms and the school nutrition programme and suggests that the future of both programmes is intertwined. Therefore, in the absence of re-designed legislation in the area of the school funding norms, efforts at developing a full-blown anti-poverty school nutrition programme are frustrated. This explains why provincial education departments' first policy impulse was oriented towards a maximum extension of the nutrition programme to larger number of primary schools. Finally, communities need to be a given a greater stake in the delivery of healthy food. This not only enhances the budgetary value we all get from the delivery of the school nutrition programme, but builds nutrition-conscious communities whose actions stretch far beyond the programme confines of the school nutrition programme.

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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

Eight years after the birth of the school nutrition programme, and in the context of spiralling food prices, the national Cabinet of South Africa chose to affirm the school nutrition programme in the following manner (Cabinet Statement, 25 July 2002):

It is in this context of a comprehensive approach to poverty eradication that Cabinet examined the Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Comprehensive Social Security and comments from the public. In addition to these issues, further work is being done to examine the efficacy of increasing the age of child grant beneficiaries as well as massive expansion and improvement in the efficiency of the school nutrition programme.

Further Cabinet statements (in September 2002) re-affirmed Cabinet's interpretation of the school nutrition programme as an essential anti-poverty programme.[iii] Without further debate as to whether Cabinet's positions define the school nutrition programme as a nutrition or anti-poverty programme primarily, it is clear that the Cabinet statements seem to support the further extension of the school nutrition programme.

In a different, but related context, researchers have estimated the impact of social security on various measures of household welfare (Economic Policy Research Institute, 2004). Table 1 shows the impact of a select number of variables on household food shares and household basic food shares.

Table 1: Household expenditure models of food shares (See full table in the appendix)

	All food items		Basic food items	
Predictor variables	**Coefficient**	**P-value**	**Coefficient**	**P-value**
ln (household income per capita	-0.077619	0.000	-0.045139	0.000
Remittance received by household	0.000276	0.995	0.0114	0.674
Years of education attained by household head	0.36863	0.000	0.08086	0.074
State Old Age pension	1.52	0.000	0.869	0.000
Child Support grant	1.47498	0.002	1.17706	0.000
Disability grant	2.49501	0.000	1.25238	0.000

Source: Economic Policy Research Institute (2004: 78)

Restricting our attention to the receipt of social grants, EPRI (2004: 79) notes that each thousand rand of annual state old age pension is associated with an increase of 1.5 per percentage points in the share of household spending on all food items. Similar and stronger patterns are found for the child support grant and the disability grants. Although the impact of these grants on household basic food shares is less, the overall positive pattern is maintained. EPRI (2004: 75) summarises the evidence by saying

This is the most robust finding of the expenditure analysis-regardless of the type of social grant, or how the food share is calculated, social grants are associated with an increased allocation of spending ***in a manner that supports better nutrition*** (our emphasis).

The link between social grants and better nutrition that is claimed by the EPRI report is facilitated by the nature of the grant. Social grants are *cash transfers*, which permit individual and household discretion over the use of these grants. This does not imply that grant recipients always take decisions that support better nutrition outcomes, but the space undeniably exists for good decisions to be made. This contrasts sharply with the school nutrition programme, which is an example of an *in-kind transfer or benefit.* Images of schooling communities passively receiving school nutrition benefits are not exaggerated. This is the case because the school nutrition programme has not been transformed from a nationally imposed school feeding option, and this makes effective linkages between the nutrition programme and strong nutrition outcomes unlikely.[iv] Therefore, the link between school nutrition as an in-kind transfer and better nutrition is not automatic, precisely because of the absence of choice for beneficiaries.

Although Cabinet statements and academic commentators presently refer to the school nutrition programme as an exclusively feeding programme, the argument for the transformation of this programme that would enable greater community participation remains strong. Community actors that are directly linked with the school nutrition programme need nutrition education programmes and advocacy. Communities also need ownership of these programmes. We motivate this because we believe that strong links between the school nutrition programme and good nutritional (and health) outcomes would support and enhance the reality of budgetary increases to

the school nutrition programme allocations. The transformation of the school nutrition programme would therefore coincide with attempts at reforming the efficiency and effectiveness of spending on this vital programme.

Road map of the occasional paper

This paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 reviews the local literature on the implementation of the school nutrition programme. It also discusses the implications of the local literature and how this impacts on the development of specific objectives for the present paper. Section 3 discusses three different public finance contexts within which the school nutrition programme operated. The first sub-section deals with the inception of the nutrition programme and how it was affected by the prevailing fiscal circumstances and policies so powerfully represented in the *White Paper on Reconstruction and Development 1994.* The second sub-section examines the school nutrition programme under the integrated nutrition programme and compares trends in real growth of consolidated provincial health spending to real growth of the school nutrition allocation. Reference is also made to conditional grant reforms that were introduced in this period. The final sub-section considers the school nutrition programme in its present context where it operates as a stand-alone conditional grant administered by the Department of Education. Section 4 discusses service delivery and implementation issues. We examine issues pertaining to the efficiency and effectiveness of spending through available time-series data. We also undertake an analysis of differences in targeting methodologies between provincial health and provincial education departments and how these have affected the overall effectiveness of spending. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.

SECTION 2: REVIEWING THE LOCAL LITERATURE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SCHOOL NUTRITION PROGRAMME

The school nutrition programme (formerly known as the primary school nutrition programme-PSNP) was introduced in September 1994 as one of the Presidential Lead Projects. In its original guise, the *White Paper on Reconstruction and Development 1994* (page 46) described the aims of the PSNP as follows:

To contribute to the improvement of education quality by enhancing primary pupils' learning capacity, school attendance and punctuality and contribute to general health development by alleviating hunger. Educating pupils on nutrition and also improving nutritional status through micro-nutrition supplementation. Parasite eradication where indicated. To develop the nutrition component of the general education curriculum.

It is not difficult to understand why there was so much debate and discussion about the status of the school nutrition programme because both feeding and broader nutritional health outcomes were linked. To help us better understand the nature of these debates, we now turn to a critical body of knowledge, which had developed as government-sponsored reviews and independent academic analyses of the school nutrition programme.

Although this section does not present an exhaustive account of such research, we aim to develop the main ideas and research findings from the

established *local* body of work on the school nutrition programme.[v] Researchers' views and findings are discussed with a view to

- Their overall perspective on the school nutrition programme.
- The stated benefits and costs of the school nutrition programme.
- The conditions that would enhance the successful implementation of the school nutrition programme.
- The future of the school nutrition programme.

The Child Health Unit (1997) regarded the primary school nutrition programme (and particular its manifestation as a feeding programme) as only one component of a comprehensive nutrition strategy. The latter would include school feeding, the mass application of de-worming medication, the delivery of micronutrients, control of parasitic worm infections, family planning, life skills, and education aimed at reducing tobacco and alcohol use. Factors that counted in the favour of school-based nutrition programmes were access to ready-made infrastructure and the fact that there are normally more teachers than nurses, as well as a greater number of schools than clinics. From a cost perspective, the researchers argued compellingly that an exclusive focus on school feeding is counter-productive, too costly, logistically difficult to implement, and that school feeding was locking in scarce human and material resources. An unconvincing body of research on the potential benefits of school feeding further fuelled a scathing review of the stand-alone school feeding programme. The Child Health Unit (1997) believed that other components of a comprehensive strategy should be promoted, the school nutrition programme needed to be extended to the pre-school cohorts, and the active promotion of community-based nutrition programmes to enhance education and awareness of nutrition matters. Finally, these researchers argued for the down-scaling of school feeding through narrower targeting practices, while up-scaling neglected areas of an integrated school nutrition response. Narrow targeting would contain the cost of school feeding, while providing financial scope for neglected areas of an integrated school nutrition response.

The Louw, Bekker, and Wentzel-Viljoen 2001 evaluation (hereafter referred to as Louw et al.) focused on assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of school feeding in terms of specific implementation and operational issues. The perspective of this group of researchers was that if the school feeding programme could be properly designed and effectively implemented, the benefits of school feeding far outweigh the investment made by government (Louw et al., 2001: viii). To support their view of school nutrition, Louw et al. (2001: 156 and 157) quoted international studies that record the positive impact of school feeding on school attendance, community involvement in schooling, and reduced malnutrition rates.[vi] Results from their sample study also indicated gains in areas of concentration spans, punctuality, school performance, and the alleviation of temporary hunger. Although no explicit policy costs were mentioned, the researchers believed that service level agreements between education and health, standardisation of menu and costs of menu, a simplified programme implementation, and the monitoring of processes would create favourable conditions for implementation. While speculatively posing the question about the future of the school nutrition programme, Louw et al. (2001: 241) recommended that the then primary

school nutrition programme continues as a nutrition programme as opposed to being a social relief or anti-poverty programme.

Steyn and Labadarios (2002) reviewed the implementation of nutrition policy by analysing components of the Department of Health's integrated nutrition programme (INP). The researchers' perspective on the school nutrition programme was that as long as unemployment remained high, "supplementary school meals for needy school children should be continued" (page 333). Although their paper did not deliberate on the policy costs of the nutrition programme, it bemoaned the lack of progress that had been made since the first full-scale review (the Child Health Unit 1997 report) was conducted in 1996. They also argued that problems relating to targeting and learner/school coverage had not been solved. In terms of the future of the nutrition policy, the researchers argued that cost-effectiveness analyses should be conducted to determine physical and intellectual performance benefits.

Following all these reviews, the Department of Health's (Kloka, 2003: 1) response was very instructive. It argued that

"*The PSNP was primarily designed to provide direct services to primary school learners to reduce hunger and to alleviate the effect of malnutrition on their learning capacity and* ***not to improve the nutritional status of school learners***" (Department of Health's own emphasis, page 1).

Furthermore, it cited the research done by Louw et al. (2001) indicating that school feeding contributed to household food security and that it was not seen by educators as an infringement on learning time, or as requiring too much time. The Department of Health also endorsed many of the recommendations from the Louw et al. (2001) report and concluded that standardised menu options, refined poverty targeting, implementation simplicity (feed early morning), a food safety monitoring system, and a national school feeding data base would aid the implementation of school nutrition programmes. The future of the school feeding programme was mapped out in 2003 as involving a transfer of responsibilities to the education sector. The reasons given were the education outcomes of school feeding; the fact that school feeding was implemented in schools; and to facilitate the inclusion of school feeding into the broader context of education development (Department of Health, 2003: 2).

Hunter, May, and Padayachee (2003-hereafter referred to as Hunter et al.) examined the contested issue of poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) in developing countries and attempted to outline South Africa's "poverty reduction" strategy. Their perspective on the nutrition programme was that services, which are preventative in nature (such as sanitation and nutrition), have benefits that outweigh their costs and should be expanded. They did however point to serious implementation problems concerning poor learner coverage, the lack of good data, the absence of a national nutritional surveillance system, leakage of funding, and ineffective monitoring and evaluation of nutrition programmes. Based on their understanding of poverty reduction processes, they argued for improvement in implementation on two grounds. Targeting processes needed to be refined to permit maximum coverage of the needy, and pro-poor targeting policies should be

better co-ordinated so that the benefits of the nutrition programme are supplemented and enhanced.

Brand (2004) discussed the primary school nutrition programme within the context of national food security generally, and household food security more specifically. His perspective on the nutrition programme was that it should not be regarded as government's premier nutritional programme in respect of children (Page 114). According to Brand (2004), the services of the programme were too intermittent and it covered too small a part of the year to qualify comprehensively as a nutritional programme. In the absence of other more comprehensive programmes that would realise children's right to nutrition, Brand recognised the primary school nutrition programme as the "only programme that is explicitly (even if only partially) intended to directly advance children's right to basic nutrition." However, if government is intent on regarding the school nutrition programme as the premier programme realising children's right to food, then the policy would impose a cost that is not worth bearing according to Brand. Brand argued that the absence of a comprehensive social security net weakens the impact of the school nutrition programme. In addition, the fact that it targets only a small portion of needy children further weakens its claims as a comprehensive nutrition programme. He argued for the continuation of narrow targeting and insisted that instead of increasing the number of beneficiaries, the emphasis should be placed on improving delivery to the present beneficiaries.

The broader implications of research: developing objectives for the present paper

Two issues stand out from the review of the local literature, namely the classificatory status of the nutrition programme and the question (or implications) of the policy costs of the nutrition programme.

With regards to the first question, researchers either regard the school nutrition programme as a feeding scheme or alternatively as a more comprehensive nutrition programme. Consistent with the idea of calling the school nutrition programme a nutrition programme would be the (cost and targeting) containment of the school feeding component and the corresponding up-scaling of other aspects of a comprehensive school nutrition strategy. This thought does not only speak to nutritional considerations, but goes to the heart of efficient and effective spending of scarce State resources. It suggests a process where school feeding targeting would be stricter and fewer schools and learners would be included, especially given explicit budgetary constraints. This would create the financial space for other (perhaps more vital) elements of an integrated school nutrition response. The obverse of this argument is also compellingly simple: if we regard the present school nutrition programme primarily as a feeding programme, then the arguments for tighter targeting and containment of the overall costs of school feeding are considerably weakened. In the absence of an appropriate balance between feeding and other nutritional considerations, school feeding would operate in the same financial and fiscal space as funding policies that aim to reach the broadest majority of poor learners. There would be very little justification for servicing only a small percentage of poor learners, given overall levels of poverty in South Africa.

Disqualifying the school nutrition programme as a nutrition programme would therefore strengthen the argument for the extension of the programme to more poor learners in primary schools, and eventually to the extension of this programme into poor secondary schools. Most researchers in the South African context would not object to calling the school nutrition programme a school feeding scheme and therefore the above comments must apply. Thus, one of the tasks of this paper is to carefully follow output and service delivery trends of the school nutrition programme and to assess whether extension to more primary learners and poor secondary schools is feasible. This must obviously be studied within the context of the Department of Education's most recent pronouncements on the distribution of socio-economic groupings in schools.[vii]

The second question concerns the perceived "policy costs" of the school nutrition policy. Most researchers in the South African context argue that the broader policy benefits of the school nutrition programme outweigh its putative costs. These assertions are made regardless of the fact that no cost-benefit analysis or cost-effectiveness studies have been done. The Child Health Unit (1997) study is the only review that attempted to understand how the policy costs reduced the effectiveness of the school nutrition programme. Supporting the overall positive assessment of the school nutrition programme is the reality of large real budgetary increases to the school nutrition programme, which suggest a medium-term to long-term future for the nutrition programme.[viii] Problematic as these developments may be to some, the continuation of the nutrition programme warrants attention to service delivery and implementation issues. We are particularly interested in understanding how well the school nutrition policy fared in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness of spending.

A note on the research methods

Unlike the systematic sample studies of Louw et al. (2001), information on service delivery developments was exclusively obtained from eleven government agencies, namely the national Department of Education, the national Department of Health, and the nine provincial education departments (PEDs). Because much of our focus was on the most recent situation and given the fact the historical data on the school nutrition programme were available, we did not interview officials from the provincial departments of health. The service delivery information is produced by government, which means we have relied on the integrity of the respective departments concerning the accuracy and factual correctness of the data. We were unable to verify whether this information is correct as this would be beyond the scope of our available resources. Where data appeared "unusual", especially in a time-series context, we have followed this up with the respective departments. We restricted service development information to the following areas for the 2004 and 2005 academic years:

- Discretionary funding of the school nutrition programme by PEDs.
- Targeting procedures followed by PEDs and how these differ from previous targeting practices under the provincial departments of health.
- Frequency of feeding and total number of feeding days per calendar year.

- Budgetary and output trend information concerning the school nutrition programme from 1994/95 to 2005/06.
- Estimates of total cost per learner and administrative cost per learner in 2004/05 and 2005/06.
- Basic monitoring and evaluation questions.

Apart from the desktop study of the main review studies that were conducted about the school nutrition programme, we also did a comprehensive search of relevant newspaper coverage since 1994. A list of newspapers that were used is provided in the reference list.

The budget trend analyses use 2000/01 and 2004/05 as base years. Table 2 provides the CPIX deflators based on these respective base years.

Table 2: CPIX deflators using 2000/01 and 2004/05 as base years

Financial Year	2000	2004
1995	0.691867	0.537704
1996	0.74029795	0.5753431
1997	0.809485	0.629114
1998	0.867768	0.67441
1999	0.927644	0.720944
2000	1	0.777178
2001	1.066	0.828471
2002	1.170468	0.909662
2003	1.234844	0.959693
2004	1.286707	1
2005	1.340749	1.042
2006	1.411809	1.097226
2007	1.486634	1.155379

Source: Personal communication with National Treasury, 2003 (authors' own calculations)

Note: The annual index for 1996 refers to a CPI figure, because government officially started using CPIX in 1997.

SECTION 3: THE CHANGING PUBLIC FINANCE CONTEXTS OF THE NATIONAL SCHOOL NUTRITION PROGRAMME

Although public finance contexts do not correspond to a neat linearization scheme, it is undoubtedly the case that fiscal policy and budget policy in South Africa were subject to fundamental changes over the eleven year period considered in this paper. In some instances, changes were marked by the abandonment of systems, while in other instances, changes in spending patterns dictated the definition and establishment of new contexts.

The School Nutrition Programme and the White Paper on Reconstruction and Development and Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB)

The macro-economic impetus of the *White Paper on Reconstruction and Development 1994* (hereafter referred to as the RDP White Paper) can partly be traced to the policy-making process of the previous regime. The relevant policy context was the previous regime's struggle with run-away consumption expenditure and macro-economic aggregates that pointed

strongly to the "overbearing" role of the State in the economy. The policy that was developed to address these issues was the *White Paper on Privatisation and Deregulation in the Republic of South Africa (1987).* The conceptual gist of this White Paper was to lessen significantly the participation of the State in the private economy and to create more space for private sector participation. In 1985, the public sector's contribution to the Gross Domestic Product was 38.1 per cent, of which central government contributed 26 per cent (*White Paper on Privatisation and Deregulation in the Republic of South Africa*, 1987: 4). Similar "unfavourable" aggregates were quoted such as government's domination in the use of private investments, which the White Paper argued, crowded out the private sector's potential investment base.

Five years after the launch of the *White Paper on Privatisation and Deregulation in the Republic of South Africa*, many of the key targets of the policy had not materialised. The current expenditure to GDP grew from 17.4 per cent in 1980 to 28.9 per cent in 1993/94 (South African Reserve Bank, 1996). Capital spending declined in the corresponding period, while employment in the private sector decreased by 11.7 per cent in the period 1989 to 1994 (SARB, 1996). One of the stated aims of the policy was to move factors of production to the more productive private sector to encourage allocative efficiency. The net result of this action was a major public investment slowdown and some economists argued that falling parastatal investment contributed to the recession that lasted from 1989 to 1993 (Makgetla, 1995:69).

Given the failure of the apartheid regime in controlling government consumption expenditure, it fell to the post-1994 government to confront this problem. The RDP White Paper states explicitly that government's immediate challenge was to fund and staff the RDP without exacerbating already high levels of government debt (RDP White Paper, 1994: 21):

*Increasingly, the market evaluation of such a situation [of high government debt and high consumption expenditure] was that the government could not curb expenditure, dissaving would continue, the balance of payments would be adversely affected and inflation would rise. As a result, interest rates rose and increased the government debt burden. In the context of macro-economic instability, other crucial objectives can be undermined (*Our insertion*).*

Government's commitment to reducing consumption expenditure included the attempted re-direction of expenditure from consumption expenditure to capital expenditure, not filling public service vacancies and forward planning on all projects and programmes. Re-prioritisation of expenditure was supposed to have been facilitated by the introduction of the RDP Programme Fund.[ix] Resources for the RDP Fund were made up of international donor contributions and "top-slicing" from departmental budgets. Departments could in theory access these resources, but had to demonstrate commitment to expenditure re-prioritisation in line with government's key objectives. The RDP Programme Fund was therefore conceptualised as a mechanism that would start and direct a process of re-prioritisation towards government's vital new priorities.

Segal (1996) noted that the primary users of the RDP Fund were free health care, the primary school nutrition programme, education and constitutional

development. Furthermore, the RDP Fund was intended as a wedge to get departments to re-assess their core business and priorities. The RDP Office was closed in 1996 amidst concerns about effective service delivery (Business Day, 1997). The two key issues that had been mentioned as the reasons for the closure of the RDP Office were the complicated relationship between the RDP Office and national cabinet ministers, as well as the lack of expenditure re-prioritisation through the RDP Fund. In relation to the latter, it was generally accepted that departments, by applying and using RDP Fund monies, were in essence postponing expenditure re-prioritisation. A good example of this type of behaviour was evident in the pronouncements of the then Minister of Health who argued that cuts in provincial health budgets would be made good by the availability of more funds from the RDP Fund (Sidley, 1995). In addition, the health department would have asked the department of finance for more resources to cover the gaps left by the re-allocation of resources. The closure of the RDP Office was therefore seen as an admission that the RDP Fund contributed to the lack of expenditure re-prioritisation (Business Day, 1997). Projects that were funded under the banner of the RDP Fund were now integrated into the relevant departmental budgets and would have been funded since the 1997/98 financial year from own departmental funds.

The zero-base budgeting system (ZBB) was the budget al.location system that was favoured by government. This system requires that spending agencies at the national and provincial level annually review their spending items and justify their present and future funding based on approved national priorities. Abedian et al. (1997: 91) argued that spending agencies were required to define their policies, quantify their target outputs, model the costs of their programmes, and submit these as business plans to various treasuries.

The ZBB system was regarded as a natural ally to the RDP Fund process of re-prioritising expenditure (RDP White Paper, 1994: 17):

There will be a tendency for inertia when existing programmes of the government at all levels are reviewed for the purpose of re-directing expenditure and resources. In the planning and budgeting process, it is therefore essential that departments and tiers of government place all programmes on an equal footing in allocating funds, staff and resources. Programmes should not be preferentially funded and staffed purely because they have been previously established (Our italics).

The commitment to the ZBB system did not betray a short-sighted focus on the annual budget, but government believed that it was possible to link the ZBB system to multi-year budgeting. At that time, South Africa, like most other countries, budgeted on an annual basis. The RDP White Paper reflects on this link in the following manner (page 30):

At present the Budget is drawn upon an incremental basis. Allocations to the different national line function departments are decided on the basis of what the allocations were in the previous year. The government will introduce a zero-base budgetary process, by which national line function departments, provinces and other institutions of government will motivate their programmes, and on this basis determine their budgetary requirements. In addition, the government will introduce a multi-year budgeting process, by which budgets are drawn up for a period of three years on the basis of ongoing programmes.

Abedian et al. (1997: 86) noted that although the ZBB system was government's preferred budget allocation system, setting the budget to zero each year is not practical as some programmes run over more than one year. ZBB was thus a useful call for reconsideration of all expenditure items, but was never implemented.

What was the impact of these contexts on the implementation of the school nutrition programme? The impact of these contexts was twofold: a strict insistence upon non-expansion of staff levels for designated RDP Projects, and budget allocations that did not keep pace with inflation. Newly formed provincial governments were therefore required to implement a project that would require specialist staff, but for which they did not receive any additional personnel funding. The Child Health Unit (1997) bemoaned this strategy and argued that the result was an inefficient use of human resources because school feeding consumed much of the available scarce human resources. The strategy of availing earmarked funds to a sub-national sphere to further national objectives had not taken on board the human resource requirements for successful implementation.[x] It would appear that the roots of this conception can be found in the immediate post-1994 fiscal context where government deliberately tried to contain government consumption expenditure.

The second recognisable impact of this period was the real reduction in the school nutrition budget over the first few years. For the period 1995/96 to 1997/98, the school nutrition allocation declined by approximately 8.0 per cent in real terms. Over the period 1995/96 to 2000/01, the school nutrition allocation declined in real terms by 4.2 per cent. We are aware that great caution is required in interpreting the large real declines purely from the point of view of government's fight against consumption expenditure. This is the case because in 1996, government's fiscal and budget policy were made with reference to its macro-economic policy, Gear. However, the thrust of Gear was also to moderate spending claims on the national purse and thus the overall effect would have been the same. If we interpret non-expansion of staff levels and real declines in the school nutrition allocations together, the containment of the funding of the school nutrition programme was achieved.

With the closure of the RDP Office in 1996 and budget reform focusing strongly on the development of a multi-year budget framework, the ZBB system was abandoned in favour of the medium term expenditure framework (MTEF). With government accepting the medium term nature of expenditure, ZBB would no longer have sufficed as a budget allocation system. Furthermore, government's wishes to give more predictability and stability to the budget system would have made the MTEF the preferred candidate. So by the start of the 1998/99 financial year, two crucial components of the post-1994 fiscal set-up, namely the RDP Fund mechanism and the ZBB system, were abandoned.

School Nutrition Programme under the Banner of the Integrated Nutrition Programme Conditional Grant

In the 1997 *White Paper for the Transformation of the Health Sector,* the Department of Health declared four components of an integrated nutrition strategy. These were the health facility-based component, a community-based component, a nutrition-promotion programme, and a national nutrition surveillance system. The school nutrition policy was categorised under the community-based component. The 1998 health document *Integrated Nutrition Policy: a Foundation for Life* directed that nutrition policy should be targeted towards vulnerable children and women. In addition, it argued for integrated approaches and a break with fragmented food-based approaches.

The integration of the primary school nutrition programme into the integrated nutrition programme was a direct consequence of the 1997 *White Paper for the Transformation of the Health Sector.* This integration did not change the status of the primary school nutrition component as being a direct in-kind transfer and therefore all the comments about the limitations of such funding still apply. However, we feel that there are two other issues that now require closer scrutiny. The school nutrition programme's integration under the integrated nutrition programme happened over a six-year period, namely 1998/99 to 2003/04. Two distinct periods in the evolution of public finances in South Africa are contained during this period and so the first issue relates to how the school nutrition programme navigated these contexts. We answer this question by using consolidated provincial health budgets as anchors in our interrogation of broader spending patterns. The second big issue concerns the development of conditional grants and the initial problems that were experienced with this funding mechanism. Towards the end of the section, we briefly consider how both these contexts affected prioritisation and implementation of the school nutrition programme.

The discussion of the school nutrition programme under the banner of the integrated nutrition programme does not mean that the period 1998/99 to 2003/04 was undivided in a public finance sense. In fact, social services spending struggled under the grip of Gear in the period 1996-2000, although the extent of reductions was not uniform across government departments.[xi] There is an overall consensus today that after 2000, government was in a position to accelerate spending in areas that were worst hit by the fiscal austerity measures during the Gear period.

Figure 1 compares the real year-on-year growth rates of consolidated provincial health budgets, integrated nutrition grant spending, and primary school nutrition spending over the period 1998/1999 to 2002/03.

Figure 1: Real year-on-year change in the budget allocations of consolidated provincial health, integrated nutrition grant and primary school nutrition programme, 1998/99 to 2002/03 (2000 Rands)



Source: Personal communication with Department of Health 2005 and National Treasury's Intergovernmental Fiscal Reviews 2001, 2003 and 2005

While we have alluded to the fact that the integrated nutrition grant period includes possibly two different moments in the evolution of fiscal management in South Africa, this appears to apply exclusively to consolidated provincial health spending. We see clearly that in 1999, provincial health budgets were still in real decline, but appeared to pick up steam in the post-1999 period. Thus, for the period defined in the chart above, provincial health spending recovered strongly and registered a four-year average annual growth of approximately 1.4 per cent. Blecher and Thomas (2003: 275) noted that although real increases took place in the post-2000 period, most of these increases appeared to have been absorbed by rising wage costs and medical inflation. Such real increases did not therefore result in improved service coverage and quality.

These comments are particularly useful in the context of financing trends for the integrated nutrition grant and the primary school nutrition programme. The real year-on-year trend for the primary school nutrition programme conforms more to general developments in social expenditure over the 1996-2000 period. Over this period, the school nutrition programme showed consistent negative declines but unlike overall health spending, there was no notable growth after 2000. In fact, over the period depicted in the chart above, the school nutrition programme sustained real average annual losses of 7.0 per cent. Although the integrated nutrition grant suffered similar losses over the same period (4.4% four-year decline), the primary school nutrition programme bore heavier losses. However, the overall trend suggests that grant funding for nutrition-related interventions suffered badly, even in a context where overall health funding was beginning to increase.

We examine longer term trends of the school nutrition programme in later sections, but we can observe that the real decline in spending could not be blamed solely on poor spending performance. Although the spending rate on the school nutrition programme was highly variable and there were clear inefficiencies in spending, collectively over the 1998/99-2002/03 period, provinces managed to spend on average 86.0 per cent of budgeted

allocations. These represented levels of spending that were much higher than comparable spending on conditional grants in provincial education departments. In the *2000 Budget Review,* the National Treasury recognised the problems of conditional grant spending and discussed planned changes to the conditional grant framework (page 157):

Over the past two years, significant underspending of certain conditional grants resulted in rollovers. These rollovers reflect not only a lack of experience with administering such grants but also insufficient capacity at both the national and provincial levels to monitor and implement these programmes. Within national departments, conditional grants have been insufficiently integrated with strategic planning and budget processes. The roles and responsibilities of national departments and grant recipients have often been unclear, further complicating grant management.

These points were further discussed in National Treasury's *Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2001* (113) where confusion over accountability, poor design and planning, inadequate transparency in allocations, too many conditional grants, and poor monitoring were pointed out. It is our view that these problems were a symptom of the state of intergovernmental fiscal management at the time. Barberton (2002a: 2) argued that the period 1996-2000 was a particularly challenging time as national and provincial departments were learning how to manage conditional grants more effectively. He further alleged that national departments were slow in assisting provinces in key areas of fiscal management, thus delaying effective implementation of grant funding. Although new cross-sphere budget institutions were introduced such as the Budget Council and various MINMECs[xii], these institutional gains required a longer time horizon before actual improvements in inter-governmental fiscal management could be observed.

Barberton (2002b: 213) noted that at the start of the 2001/02 financial year, government increased the transparency of the *Division of Revenue Act* by including detailed conditions for the management and use of conditional grants.[xiii] Furthermore, by 2002, all the components of the expanded framework for planning, reporting, and review that were developed in the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) were in place. Finally, at the start of the 2003/04 financial year, the entire budget process would have been properly sequenced, indicating the significant progress that was made in improving inter-governmental fiscal management. Proper sequencing implies that the entire budget process is anchored in the definition of political goals and that the strategic planning process, the actual budget and implementation, review and reporting follow accordingly. Budget implementation would require monthly actual spending reports as well as quarterly service delivery reports. Such tools should enable careful monitoring of conditional grant spending and a co-operative governance approach to solving problems if these are prominent. Control over spending-if not necessarily service delivery dynamics-had apparently been achieved at the tail end of a long budget reform process.

Variable spending patterns in the school nutrition programme appear to vanish at the end of 2001/02. Since the start of the 2002/02 financial year, grant spending on the school nutrition programme remained *consistently high.* Although the passage of time offers an alternative explanation for the stability of spending since 2002/03, we cannot rule out the possibility that

reforms to the conditional grant framework had a definite impact on the most recent spending patterns. We review output trends in the next main section, but we can add that stable learner and school numbers would also have contributed to the stable spending that took place since 2002/03. So while the school nutritional allocations continued to decrease in real terms in successive budget years, stable and consistently high spending rates since 2002 partially began to compensate for the severe funding neglect of the programme since its inception.

The Department of Education's inheritance of the school nutrition policy was therefore marked by two features: budgeted school nutrition allocations that consistently suffered real declines and a conditional grant framework that was now much more enabling in promoting effective and efficient implementation.

School Nutrition Programme as a Stand-alone Conditional Grant with the Department of Education

In discussing the transfer of the primary school nutrition programme from the Department of Health to the Department of Education, the national Department of Health (following a Cabinet decision) pointed to

- The education outcomes of school feeding;
- The fact that school feeding is implemented in schools, which is the functional responsibility of Education; and
- Facilitation of the inclusion of school feeding into the broader context of education development (Kloka, 2003: 2).

Our task in this section is to sketch the prevailing funding and policy contexts in provincial education, and to understand how these may impact on the implementation of the school nutrition programme. Based on this review, we speculate about the funding future of school nutrition as well as the implications of the extension of the national school nutrition programme (as it is now called) to secondary schools serving poor learners.

How did consolidated provincial education funding fare over the period 1995/96 to 2005/06? Figure 2 details the real growth of consolidated provincial education spending over this period.

Figure 2: Real growth of consolidated provincial education expenditure, 1995/96 to 2007/08 (2004 Rands)



Source: Budget Review 2000/IGFR 1995-2003/Provincial Estimates of Expenditure 2005/06

Note: The CPIX value for 1996 is a calendar year value (7%) taken from Budget Review 2000 (page 40)

There are three features that defined consolidated provincial education funding over this period. Firstly, the upswing in expenditure in 1996 was caused by the historic wage settlements between public service unions and government. The brevity of this upswing reflects the "accidental" and unplanned nature of these increases. Secondly, the period between 1996 and 2000 was characterised by real declines in provincial education spending. The post-2000 period was characterised by a moderate, but steady increase in provincial education funding. The length of the post-2000 curve suggests that these changes were intended, unlike the experiences in 1996. Wildeman (2003) argued that post-2000 expenditure growth was defined to accommodate increases in non-personnel and capital funding. He also argued that such funding changes were conceptualised within the ambit of narrow targeting. Such targeting had the effect of containing the cost of post-2000 redress and allowed provincial education departments to stay within their spending envelopes.

An abiding feature of post-2000 education funding has been the focus on programmes and activities that -when compared to the overall funding base in provincial education-are relatively small. In 2005/06, personnel expenditure still consumed on average approximately 90 per cent of provincial spending, while capital accounted for 4.1 per cent. Non-personnel and non-capital expenditure would have made up the rest and yet this is the base from which most of the post-2000 policies is funded. The first implication of the school nutrition's transfer to education is that the programme would become part of a context where real increases have been made available to relatively small programmes. Under the supervision of education, the funding fortunes of the national school nutrition programme are therefore set to change from negative to positive real gains. Indeed, if one examines the growth of the national school nutrition programme over the medium term, it is projected to grow at a real average annual rate of 6.4 per cent. This is a far cry from the drips it was accustomed to under the RDP Fund and the integrated nutrition grant mechanisms.

Further to the context within which the national school nutrition programme is inserted would be the barrage of changes related to school funding. The

school funding norms, which were first implemented in 2000, were intended to guide the allocation of non-personnel/non-capital spending *within* provincial education departments. Inequitable funding bases meant that some provinces appeared to have implemented this policy more successfully than others (See Wildeman, 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2004). One of the biggest concerns was the unequal treatment of poor learners across provincial departments. Political pressure and pressure from civil society groupings resulted in a fundamental review of the cost of schooling, including a sustained focus on the school funding norms (Department of Education, 2003a and 2003b). The net result of all these policy debates was the positing of "adequacy" amounts for school funding allocations and the declaration of school-fee free schools (Department of Education 2004). Wildeman (2004) argued that these proposed changes did not herald the beginning of adequacy funding, but the Department of Education was merely using its moral clout to define what it considers as decent funding allocations.

What is different, following the suggested policy changes, is the methodology of determining the definition of poor learners across provincial boundaries. Using national income and expenditure data, the Department of Education proposed a division of learners into five quintiles that follows the national distribution of income categories or quintiles. In poor provinces, this has the effect of increasing the number of poor learners that need to be considered for redress. In rich provinces, this has the impact of reducing the numbers of learners in the poorest categories, and results in large number of previously defined poor learners being located in richer income brackets.

Table 3 demonstrates this situation and reflects earlier work done by the Department of Education in fitting provincial income distributions within nationally-defined income brackets.

Table 3: The distribution of national income quintiles at provincial level according to Statistics South Africa 2000 data (%)

	National quintiles					
	1 (poorest)	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5 (least poor)**	**Total**
Eastern Cape	34	26	18	10	11	100
Free State	33	20	16	14	18	100
Gauteng	7	11	18	28	35	100
KwaZulu Natal	19	22	22	21	16	100
Limpopo	27	25	22	15	10	100
Mpumalanga	14	23	25	21	17	100
Northern Cape	18	17	21	20	23	100
North West	20	19	23	23	15	100
Western Cape	4	10	16	29	40	100
South Africa	**20**	**20**	**20**	**20**	**20**	**100**

Source: Department of Education, 2003b: 17

The proposed changes do not only impact on the implementation of the school funding norms, but affect every policy that targets poor learners in provincial public schools. Changes to the school funding norms do not

assume a distinction between poor primary and secondary school learners. Although the *South African Schools Act of 1996* is relatively clear in terms of its definition of "compulsory education", the school funding norms in targeting recurrent non-personnel/non-capital funding do not draw a compulsory/non-compulsory distinction.[xiv] At a minimum, this would suggest that reference to the "primary school nutrition programme" would be problematic because the re-distribution of learners in table 3 does not distinguish between primary and secondary school learners. Thus, the primary axis of the re-definition of poor learners is not the grade level of learners, but broader poverty conditions that define the circumstances of learners and their schools. The net effect of such changes would require the re-definition of the school nutrition programme away from grade level (primary school nutrition programme) to a school feeding programme that serves poor primary, secondary, and Grade R learners. This is consonant with the call by the African National Congress for the extension of the programme into poor secondary schools (Martin, 2002).

This theoretical re-definition of the scope of the school nutrition programme is unlikely to be implemented without significant new tensions emerging. Chief among these would be the net funding implications of the re-distribution of poor learners within provincial education departments. Table 3 shows that poorer provinces have more learners who qualify for immediate redress funding, and therefore the cost of maintaining the nutrition programme would be higher. These provinces have never quite managed to improve their personnel/non-personnel ratios, and therefore the scope for radical expansion of the school nutrition programme is limited. Under such circumstances, the question must be asked whether extension of the school nutrition programme should not rather focus on bringing more primary schools into the scheme. This would sacrifice poor secondary schools' claims to participation in the scheme and water down the intended aims of pro-poor learner funding.

In the case of the traditionally affluent provinces, comparatively smaller numbers of poor learners are located in the poorest income categories. The financial pressure to deliver to these groups of learners would be relatively less for richer provinces. This opens the possibility of defining the prime beneficiaries of the school nutrition programme across schooling phases and conforming to the poverty definition of participating schools. If this logic is correct, the school nutrition programme in richer provinces would be able to accommodate both poor primary and secondary schools. All of this suggests that the school nutrition programme is projected to grow strongly over the medium term, but that the source of the growth would differ across provinces. Poor provinces are likely to extend the school nutrition programme to more poor primary schools, while traditionally rich provinces would appear to be in a better position to accommodate both schooling phases.

This does not negate additional funding pressures: in poor provinces, nothing prevents agitation for the extension of the programme to poor secondary schools. Neither does the actual extension of the programme to secondary schools in rich provinces eliminate funding problems with regards to excluded poor primary schools. But it does appear that well-intended

policies and reforms will likely lead to further fragmentation of national policy ideals.

The next section considers trend data that speak to the efficiency and effectiveness of the school nutrition programme.

SECTION 3: SERVICE DELIVERY AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

This section deals with service delivery and implementation trends. Conceptually, the first sub-section discusses the efficiency of spending by examining the deviation between budgeted and actual expenditure. We also re-visit interpretations about the size and magnitude of the school nutrition budget. We continue our probing of efficiency by comparing overall per learner costs across provincial education departments. The second sub-section assesses the effectiveness of spending. We start by discussing changes in learner and school targeting and then shift attention to learner and school output data. The third sub-section offers summary remarks about the efficiency and effectiveness of the school nutrition programme.

Funding trends: assessing the efficiency of spending on the school nutrition programme, 1995/96 to 2005/06

Figure 3 provides information on real trends in budgeted expenditure on the school nutrition programme for the period 1995/96 to 2007/08.

Figure 3: Real trends in budgeted expenditure on the school nutrition programme, 1995/96 to 2007/08 (2000 Rands)



Source: Personal communication with departments of Health and Education in 2004 and 2005; Budget Review 2005

Figure 3 indicates the strong negative declines in the early days of the school nutrition programme, and also the strong real increases that took place from 2003/04. There are varying interpretations about the status and meaning of the expenditure patterns in Figure 3 above. Brand (2004) argued that the declines need not be taken as a sign of lack of prioritisation of the school nutrition programme. They rather represented a situation where targeting had become increasingly effective and where the results of such precise targeting led to "savings." This is a remarkable conclusion especially in light of the problems that government experienced with the administration of conditional grants during this period (see public finance section). The Child

Health Unit (1997) traced the origin and meaning of the reduction in spending to the following context (page 90);

However, over the last three years, there has been a net reduction in the amount of funds allocated to the PSNP. It was for this reason that the recommended percentage RDA for energy in the school snack was reduced from 30 % to 20-25%."

If we leap forward to the time when the school nutrition programme was supposedly more effective in targeting relatively smaller learner numbers, then one would have expected the original % RDA content to have been restored. In addition, if these declines were in fact real savings, then the question must be asked why national and provincial health departments did not return to the original % RDA content, especially given the "surplus" of funding at their disposal? The length of the real decline and the fact that targeting problems were still identified as late as 2002 and 2003 (Hunter et al., 2003), suggest that the real declines were more powerfully related to the paucity of funding. Furthermore, in the context of our discussion of growth patterns in overall health spending, it is clear that the school nutrition programme was a victim of expansions in other areas of health spending. The main reasons for weakened funding support to the school nutrition were the containment of consumption expenditure, the moderation of social spending, and real increases in the wage bill of health departments. In contrast, the reasons why increased funding support have taken place since 2002/03 were the food crisis of 2002 (Terreblanche, 2002), the schooling review of the Department of Education in 2003 (Naidoo, 2003), and the nutrition programme's insertion into education budgets and funding.

How well did provincial health departments spend the limited funds that were available to them? Figure 4 provides information on real budgeted and actual expenditure on the school nutrition programme for the period 1995/96 to 2004/05. We could not access provincial data for the 1995/96-2003/04 period because it had not been recorded in such a format by the national Department of Health. The 2004/05 financial year was the first year that education took responsibility for the nutrition programme.

Figure 4: Real budgeted and actual expenditure on the school nutrition programme, 1995/96 to 2004/05 (Rands)



Source: Personal communication with the Departments of Health and Education in 2004 and 2005

Figure 4 does not present a linear view of actual spending, which is premised on the idea of weak spending at the inception stage and

progressively better spending rates at each successive year. We note that the lowest level of real actual expenditure was recorded in 1996/97. Immediately after the low of 1996/97, the next financial year saw considerable improvements in the spending ratio, only to be followed by larger deviations in the following two years. Private consultants were brought in during 1995 and 1996 to help improve actual spending (Business Day, 1997), and according to the same source, improved delivery resulted from their interventions. The net effect of their interventions would perhaps have been clearer if we had access to provincial actual spending because the aggregate numbers above present a much more complicated story. The larger real variation in actual expenditure as opposed to real budgeted allocations happened because of variable actual spending. Significantly lower actual spending in one year, which is followed by stronger actual spending in the following year, may visually communicate improvements, but such "positive" changes are a product of poor spending performance in the previous year.

From the 2002/03 financial year, budgeted and actual expenditure grew closer together to such an extent that one could no longer discern two different curves. It is ironic that such better spending ratios were taking place in contexts where the number of beneficiaries had grown. This suggests that the basic infrastructure (financial and otherwise) to implement a school feeding programme seems to be in place. This also suggests that larger number of poor learners may not necessarily present future under-spending problems, but may in fact lead to "positive" over-spending.

Table 4 sets out the actual spending ratios in nominal terms and confirms the trends that we observed in Figure 4.

Table 4: Actual expenditure as a percentage of budgeted expenditure on the school nutrition programme, 1995/96 to 2004/05

Financial Year	Budget allocation (Rands)	Actual Expenditure (Rands)	Actual Exp. as % of Budget allocation
1995	500000	375000	75.0
1996	496000	325621	65.6
1997	496000	399376	80.5
1998	465941	351559	75.5
1999	457945	356145	77.8
2000	433401	423303	97.7
2001	458938	385659	84.0
2002	469465	449692	95.8
2003	686935	663196	96.5
2004	832200	819815	98.5

Source: Personal communication with the Departments of Health and Education in 2004 and 2005

The non-linear actual expenditure patterns that we referred to are evident in the 1995-2001 data. Actual expenditure declined from 75 per cent in 1995/96 to approximately 66 per cent in 1996/97, only to go up to 81 per cent the following year. These patterns are sustained right until the 2001/02 financial year. Thereafter, especially in the context of food inflation in 2002, actual expenditure began tracking budgeted expenditure with greater

precision. The transition from the health departments to education departments in 2004/05 did not affect overall actual spending. One of the reasons for the successful transition was the amount of collaboration between health and education departments in the run-up to the handover.

The handover of the school nutrition programme from health to education means that we are now able to access provincial actual spending ratios. Figure 5 provides information on actual expenditure on the school nutrition programme in the first year under the control of education departments.

Figure 5: Actual expenditure as a percentage of budgeted expenditure on the school nutrition programme by provincial education department, 2004/05 (See table in the appendix)



Source: Personal communication with the national Department of Education 2005

Figure 5 shows that nationally, provincial education departments spent on average 99 per cent of their school nutrition allocations. There are three exceptions to the overall pattern, namely KwaZulu Natal, Limpopo, and the North West province. KwaZulu Natal recorded the lowest actual spending ratio (81.8%), which is approximately 20 percentage points lower than the national average. North West managed to spend 88.6 per cent of its allocation, which represents a spending ratio that is approximately 12 percentage points lower than the national average. In the case of the Limpopo province, indications are that the province spent 127 per cent of its original allocation. While the latter figure does appear unusual, *this situation is likely to become the norm as provincial education departments revise their targeting lists and new schools are added to the beneficiaries list*. We feel supported in this conclusion by the fact that in 2004/05, six of the nine provincial education departments spent more than 95 per cent of their original allocations. The increases in spending ratios are also supported by the continuation of tender and other service delivery arrangements that were formed under provincial health departments. While many of these contracts were subsequently cancelled, it afforded provinces continuity in service delivery, thus contributing to the high spending rates in 2004/05.

The 2004/05 expenditure data provide further context to two questions: the extension of the school nutrition programme to more schools (and in particular secondary schools) and the importance of discretionary funding. In the context of debates about who should be included in the list of beneficiaries, it is unlikely that the outcome of such debates would lead to

smaller number of targeted learners. In fact, with the financial expansion of the school nutrition programme a given, beneficiary numbers will only stabilise in the next three to five years. Four provincial education departments have already raised concerns about the adequacy of the school nutrition allocation. Three of these provinces would be classified as traditionally poor, and this reinforces our suspicion about the net impact of the Department of Education's re-definition of poor learners on poor provinces. The inclusion of more learners requires larger financial outlays, which may not be available. This focuses our attention on discretionary funding from provincial education departments' own line budgets.

Table 5 provides information for four provinces about additional funding from their own coffers for the school nutrition programme in 2004 and 2005.

Table 5: Discretionary funding made available to the school nutrition programme for selected provincial education departments, 2004/05 and 2005/06

Province	2004/05	As a % of grant allocation in 2004/05	2005/06	As a % of grant allocation in 2005/06
Gauteng	R1.2 million	1.6%	R1.27 million	1.54%
KwaZulu Natal	None	N/A	R55.4 million	27.8%
Limpopo	R20 million	13.1%	Yes, but unable to verify amount	N/A
Northern Cape	R3.5 million	15.6%	11,050 million	44.9%

Source: Personal communication with provincial education departments in 2004 and 2005

Five provincial education departments do not make provision for additional funding from their own line budgets. Those that do provide additional funding represent both poor and rich education departments. Table 5 shows that the level of discretionary provisioning strongly differs across provinces. In 2004/05, discretionary funding constituted approximately 2.0 per cent of total grant funding for Gauteng, while the percentage mark in Northern Cape was approximately 16.0 per cent. Similarly, in 2005/06, the Northern Cape's discretionary allocation is almost half of their total grant funding, while KwaZulu Natal invested 28.0 per cent from their own coffers. Gauteng maintained approximately the same ratio as in the previous financial year.

The information in Table 5 suggests that while provinces are planning extensions to the school nutrition programme, they do not have the funding bases to support expansion. Comments about the rapid extension of the school nutrition programme should therefore be regarded with great caution. Based on the funding information in Table 5, if provinces are committed to prudent spending on their conditional grant allocations, then there will not be a rush to add substantial numbers of new beneficiaries. However, the enduring popularity of the programme, coupled with political pressure, may force departments to expand participation in the school feeding scheme. This could lead to the same over-spending scenario that Limpopo experienced, and which was primarily caused by the rapid addition of new beneficiaries.

Given the pressures to deliver school nutrition to the broadest majority of poor learners, are there significant differences in the per learner costs of school feeding amongst provincial education departments?

Figure 6 provides information about the estimated per learner costs of the school feeding programme in 2004/05 and 2005/06.

Figure 6: Estimated cost per learner in 2004/05 and 2005/06 by provincial education department (See table in appendix)



Source: Personal communication with provincial education departments in 2004 and 2005

Figure 6 shows that provincial education departments maintain the same cost structure in the two years represented above. The highest per learner expenditure is recorded for the Free State and North West provinces (R1.50 per learner per day), while the lowest per learner average is recorded for Mpumalanga (R0.83 in 2004/05) and KwaZulu Natal (R0.90 in 2005/06). These are estimated actual costs and do not reflect optimal levels of delivering school nutrition to poor learners. Given the lack of guidance in this regard, it is difficult to judge these numbers and the distances among the provincial education departments. Much more research is required into this area before meaningful judgments can me made about cost-efficiency in the delivery of provincial school feeding programmes. Figure 6 does not show the differences in per learner costs between urban and rural areas, but this is a fact for many provincial education departments. As per provincial differences, we have no meaningful scale to judge an urban per learner cost of R1.50 against R1.30 for rural learners in the North West province.

The next section continues the discussion of service delivery issues, but now focuses more narrowly on the overall effectiveness of spending on the school nutrition programme.

Output trends: assessing the effectiveness of spending on the school nutrition programme, 1995/96 to 2005/06

Van der Walle (1998) notes that society stands to benefit greatly from directing resources to people who need it most, because if we succeed, both the individual's well-being and the collective well-being of a country are enhanced. The benefits of targeting are therefore aimed at enhancing government's anti-poverty campaigns and decreasing the vulnerability of the poor. With these introductory remarks, we now proceed to an examination of old and new targeting practices.

Table 6 provides information about the targeting strategies that were employed by provincial health departments in identifying individual and school-level beneficiaries.

Table 6: Provincial health targeting strategies in 2001/02

Province	Geographical	School	Grade/Age	Individual	Criteria
Eastern Cape	X	X	X		Grade R to Grade 4. All farm schools.
Free State				X	Walking distances to school more than 3 KM Caregivers that cannot provide for learners. Social problems Availability of running water at school Availability of sanitation at school Availability of electricity at schools
Gauteng	X	X		X	
KwaZulu Natal	X	X		X	Rural schools Disadvantaged schools in townships Farm schools
Limpopo	X	X			Rural, semi-urban, farm or other informal settlements
Mpumalanga	X	X		X	Poverty gap Per capita income of communities
Northern Cape	X				All rural and farm schools
North West	X			X	Rural schools-100%learners in schools Urban-10% of learners in schools Non-urban-80% of learners in schools
Western Cape			X	X	Grade R to Grade 3

Source: Louw et al. (2001: 49 and 50)

The provincial health targeting strategies depicted above were not the only methods that identified poor primary school learners. The identity of poor public primary schools was determined through the school funding norms (education) and the diverse provincial health targeting strategies (school nutrition) displayed in Table 6 above. Even informed sources that discussed the targeting process for the school nutrition programme (Louw et al., 2001) did not explicitly refer to the then emerging school funding norms. This creates the perception that there was no recognisable poverty targeting strategy in provincial education, yet in 2001, the school funding norms entered its second year of implementation. This situation reflects poor inter-departmental communication in the implementation of a policy that cuts across the education and health sectors. In fairness to provincial health departments, it must be said that there was no uniform targeting strategy across provincial education departments and therefore little confidence that the provincial education targeting process would accurately identify the poorest of the poor.

The common denominator that runs through the provincial targeting strategies in table 6 is the (official policy) recognition that schools in rural and semi-urban areas, farm schools, and schools in informal settlements should enjoy the highest priority. Besides this minimum consensus, provincial health departments developed their own indicators to identify participating and needy schools and learners. Table 6 makes the point

clearly that the school nutrition programme at the time was relatively undeveloped, because some provinces such as the Eastern and Western Cape only targeted the foundation phase. While such targeting would no longer be acceptable today, in the context of what the Child Health Unit (1997) argued for, such targeting would have made perfect sense then. Six provinces also indicated that they used some form of individual targeting, i.e. providing only to particular children in schools, rather than to all children in targeted schools. Mtyala (2003) wrote about the Western Cape context and pointed to the socially undesirable impact of individual targeting, especially the stigmatisation of children who receive these meals.

The dual system of identifying poor public primary schools through provincial health and provincial education targeting strategies resulted in targeting systems that did not necessarily identify the same schools as "disadvantaged." Given the government's rallying call of "integrated service delivery", this non-coincidence reduced the overall impact of redress spending for many schools. This was the case because the ideal must have been that those schools or learners who were participating in the school feeding scheme should also have received affirmation through the school funding norms. We are unable to provide any information about the number of such mis-classified schools, but the fact that provincial education departments are presently revising their databases suggests that such mistakes were common.

Table 7 provides information about provincial education targeting practices in 2004/05.

Table 7: Summary features of targeting practices in 2004/05 by provincial education departments

Province	Grades	Priority Quintiles	Additional features
Eastern Cape	Grade R to Grade 7	Quintiles 1 and 2	For non-farm schools, Grade R-4. For farm schools, Grades R to 7 are targeted
Free State	Grade R to Grade 7	Quintiles 1 and 2	School funding norms were used to update inherited provincial health databases
Gauteng	Grade R to Grade 7	Quintiles 1 and 2; Quintiles 3 and 4	100% coverage for quintiles 1 and 2, while 75% coverage for rest
KwaZulu Natal	Grade R to Grade 7	Quintiles 1 and 2, 2038 schools	1420 schools located in quintiles 3-5 inherited from health department
Limpopo	Grade R to Grade 7	Quintiles 1 to 3	All farm schools are targeted.
Mpumalanga	Grade R to Grade 7	Quintile ranking was problematic. Physical condition of buildings was considered instead of poverty index.	All farm schools are targeted.
Northern Cape	Grade R to Grade 7	Quintiles 1 to 5	Schools within rural and urban presidential nodes are top priority.
North West	Grade R-Grade 4 or Grade 1- Grade 5	Quintile 1 and 2	We feed the first five grades
Western Cape	Grade R to Grade 7	Poverty Index targeting the four poorest segments	Poorest (0.9=90%), second poorest (0.8=40%) and third and fourth [combined] poorest (0.7 + 0.6 =25%)

Source: Personal communication with provincial education departments in 2004 and 2005

In interpreting targeting trends in table 7, we have to remember that the Department of Education's proposed re-definition of poor learners does not apply. Latest indications are that provinces are still in discussion with the Department of Education and that the process will only be finalised towards the beginning of 2006.

In contrast to the information in table 6, table 7 displays far greater uniformity in the targeting strategies of provincial education departments. Across provinces, there was near uniformity in the selection of Grade R to Grade 7 as the main beneficiaries. Early reviews of the school nutrition programme had consistently emphasised the policy and nutritional importance of focusing on the very young. Researchers who had been calling for such changes would take great heart from the initiative to introduce Grade R as part of the participating group of learners benefiting from school feeding. However, our optimism of this strategy is tempered by the fact that government-supported Grade R facilities are a drop in the ocean compared to the numerous ECD facilities that do not receive funding support from the State. Bolowana (2004) noted that in KwaZulu Natal, many parents rushed their children out of un-subsidised ECD programmes into primary schools to access policies of fee exemptions and of course the school nutrition programme. Bolowana (2004) further noted that in rural and poverty nodal areas, very few pre-schools were either registered or subsidised and are consequently dependent on fees by parents.

There are two exceptions to the strategy of targeting Grade R to Grade 7, namely the Eastern Cape and North West. Both offer a truncated version and only target learners from Grade 1 to Grade 4 in the Eastern Cape, and Grade R to Grade 4 in the case of North West. In the case of the Eastern Cape, budget constraints have forced a strategy where only Grades 1 to 4 in poor non-farm schools are targeted, while Grade 1 to Grade 7 are targeted in farm schools. Apart from the opportunity costs of not feeding learners in Grade R, the Eastern Cape's non-farm schools are poorly covered. In addition, the number of feeding days varies between three and five days, but recently, the Eastern Cape Department made it clear that it can only afford to feed children three days per week (Cape Times, 2005). In North West, similar budgetary reasons are provided for the poor coverage of the primary school grades. In 2004/05, only poor learners in Grades R to 4 were fed.

Barring these exceptions in targeting, targeting in 2004/05 was boosted by the selective use of poverty quintiles. While the new nationally defined poverty quintile system has not been implemented, some departments continued with inherited schools and added new schools based on their quintile location. This was one of the reasons for the sharp increase in beneficiary numbers in 2004/05. Provinces find themselves in a difficult position, because the application of the school funding norms must mean that many of these schools should be removed from the list of participating schools. In fact, we argue that such arrangements make it hard to extend the benefits of the school nutrition programme to more poor primary and secondary learners. This situation provides strong evidence of targeting inefficiencies and confirms the non-coincidence of old and new targeting strategies in identifying poor primary schools. KwaZulu Natal offers a strong example of this dilemma because it has a sizeable number of beneficiaries in the more "affluent" poverty quintiles. From a preliminary analysis of the old and new targeting practices, it would appear that the education funding norms (imperfect as they are) provide more precise targeting of poor schools. In the traditionally rich province of Gauteng, this department has chosen to affirm learners in poverty quintiles 1 to 4, even though the degree of coverage differs slightly across the quintiles. Although the distribution of the Western Cape cannot be broken down into quintiles, it is almost certain that should a quintile concept be imposed, we would find that learners in "quintiles" 1 to 4 are affirmed. However, table 7 makes it clear that the difference in coverage rates for poor learners in different poverty segments is substantial.

Targeting strategies in 2004/05 reveal an uneasy alliance of grade targeting and the selective and non-uniform use of poverty quintiles. Should developments concerning the proposed provincial poverty quintiles be finalised, earlier comments about the differential impact of such schemes on rich and poor provinces still apply. What were the fruits of targeting and did targeting succeed in reaching a larger number of learners and schools?

Figure 7 provides information on the number of schools that were reached as a proportion of targets set by provincial health departments.

Figure 7: Total number of school targeted and number of schools reached as a proportion of targets, 1994/95 to 2003/04 (See table in the appendix)



Source: Personal communication with Departments of Health and Education in 2004 and 2005

There are three main trends in the original targeting data: an initial surge at the start of the programme; followed by strong declines over the 1997/98 to 1999/00 period; and finally, a relatively slow expansion of total number of participating schools between 2000 and 2003. Between 1995/96 and 1996/97, there was a decline of 3085 schools participating in the nutrition programme, which represents a 15.3 per cent decrease. Thereafter, for three successive years (1997/98-1999/00), the number of schools declined by 1858 or 10.3 per cent. Since 2000/01, there has been a steady, but slow increase in the number of new schools that were added to the feeding scheme. In the four-year period (2000/01-2003/04), the number of participating schools increased from 16200 to 17000. This represents a 5.0 per cent increase, which in comparison with the multiple declines in earlier years, is relatively small. The net effect of these trends is that when we compare the total number of schools that participated in 1995/96 (20110) to that in 2003/04 (17000), 3110 fewer schools (or 15.4% less) participated in 2003/04 compared to 1995/96.

We would expect the number of participating schools to increase, especially in view of the directive from the Department of Education that schools inherited from provincial health departments must be retained. However, the rate of increase would differ according to the fiscal capacity of provinces to absorb the added costs of greater coverage. We do not support the view that the decline in number of schools is related to better and more effective strategies. In the overall context of declining and weak financial support for the school nutrition programme especially during the nutrition programme's supervision under health, the decline is directly related to availability of funding. At the inception of the programme, there was clearly an attempt to cover as many primary schools as possible.

At the start of the school nutrition programme, targeting achieved variable success rates. During this same period (1994/95-1999/00), there was no linear relationship between the total number of participating schools and target success rates. We see for example that there was a net increase in participating schools in 1997/98, yet the targeting success rate increased by

approximately 4.0 per cent. It is only after 2000, when the number of participating schools was allowed to increase slowly, that some stability had been reached concerning targeting success rates. In addition, the slow increase in the number of participating schools did not lead to a dramatic decline in the targeting success rates. This provides further evidence that smaller number of participating schools did not necessarily mean higher targeting success rates. In fact, the data show the opposite.

The number of schools that are successfully reached should not be exclusively construed as evidence of policy success. The fact that school feeding did reach schools does not reflect on the type of services that was delivered, the quality of the food, or the efficiency with which these services were delivered. Strong parallels can be drawn with the ECD sector, where policy success is measured as the total number of new government-sponsored Grade R sites. It is relatively easy to establish a Grade R site, but it is much more difficult to ensure that quality and adequate education is delivered at the site. Furthermore, in the context of pre-2004 targeting strategies, reaching a school was synonymous with working with only a few grades so that large numbers of learners would not have been serviced. The opposite also happened where in spite of limited targeting mandates in schools, all learners were fed, which resulted in the dilution of portions (Louw et al., 2001).

Figure 8 provides information about the total number of learners that were targeted and the success rates in reaching targeted learners for the period 1994/95 to 2004/05.

Figure 8: Total number of learners targeted and number of learners reached as a proportion of targets, 1994/95 to 2004/05 (See table in the appendix)



Source: Personal communication with Departments of Health and Education in 2004 and 2005

Unlike the multiple trends that we observed in the total number of schools participating in school feeding, learner numbers appear one-dimensional. Between 1995/96 and 2003/04, learner numbers dropped from a "high" of approximately 6.8 million in 1995/96 to 4.8 million in 2003/04. This represents a percentage drop of 29 per cent. If we couple this to less than perfect targeting success, especially for the period prior to 2000, then the true impact of the school nutrition programme appears very limited. It is only after 2000 that the number of those reached as a proportion of original

targets, consistently registered tallies above 90 per cent. This success takes place against a background of reductions in the total number of learners that were targeted. This trend appeared to have developed since the 2002/02 financial year. The extent of the backlogs that will have to be faced now is demonstrated with the learner data for 2004/05. More learners have participated in the school feeding scheme than was planned (107%), and we expect much the same to happen in the next few years.

Table 8 further contextualises the learner numbers by comparing participating learner numbers in the school nutrition programme to the total primary school learner population. We are now able to do this for the first time for each provincial education department.

Table 8: Primary school learners reached as a proportion of total primary school learners by provincial education departments in 2004/05 and 2005/06

Province	2004 Absolute Number	2004 as a % of primary learners	2005 Absolute Number	2005 as a % of primary learners
Eastern Cape	948 574	56%	983 412	58%
Free State	149 710	39%	234 534	62.5%
Gauteng	325 036	33%	400 866	40%
KwaZulu Natal	1 338 337	80%	1 371 777	84.1%
Limpopo	1 157 193	92%	1 140 521	99%
Mpumalanga	491 362	89,2%	492 687	90,3%
Northern Cape	121 000	88 %	124 446	92 %
North West	491 068	37%	380 385	62%
Western Cape	149 304	25.6%	156 554	27.4%

Source: Personal communication with provincial education departments 2004 and 2005

Table 8 shows two interesting features, namely a progressive increase in the coverage rate of primary school learners, and large cross-provincial differences in coverage rates of primary school learners. All the provincial education departments exhibit progressive increases in coverage of primary school learners from 2004/05 to 2005/06. Free State increased its coverage rates from 39 per cent in 2004/05 to 62.5 per cent in 2005/06, while Gauteng moved from 33.0 per cent to 40.0 per cent over the same period. Limpopo appears to have moved to universal coverage in 2005/06 (99%), while Mpumalanga and the Northern Cape achieved coverage rates above 90.0 per cent in the same year. The range of coverage of primary school learners is large and varies from 27.4 per cent in the Western Cape in 2005/06 to 99.0 per cent in Limpopo. Historical targeting practices are one of the reasons for this divergence, because in a province such as the Western Cape, restricted grade targeting (Grade R to grade 3) was practised.

Table 8 further contextualises the extension of the programme into poor secondary schools. In Limpopo, available resources have been exceeded in order to achieve near universal coverage of primary school learners. The fiscal space for expansion to poor secondary schools does not exist and the servicing of a new group of schools would require additional resources. However, in provinces such as the Eastern Cape and North West, expansion

of the number of participating poor primary schools is likely to continue, and therefore any expansion into secondary schools appears remote.

Our final service delivery information relates to the frequency of feeding. Frequency of feeding had been identified by all the major reviews as one of the biggest challenges. Table 9 provides information about the frequency of feeding per day, per week, and over the entire school calendar year for each provincial education department.

Table 9: Total number of feeding days in 2004/05 and 2005/06 by provincial education department

Province	No. of times of feeding per day	Frequency per week	Total number of feeding days in 2004	Total number of planned feeding days in 2005
Eastern Cape	Once	3-5 days	156	156
Free State	Once	5 days	186	184
Gauteng	Once	5 days	142	192
KwaZulu Natal	Once	5 days	156	173
Limpopo	Once	3-5days	156	156
Mpumalanga	Once	5 days	156	156
Northern Cape	Once	5 days	156	156
North West	Once	4 days	156	156
Western Cape	Once	5 days	170	170

Source: Personal communication with provincial education departments in 2004 and 2005

The results in table 9 follow recommendations about the standardisation of the minimum number of feeding days. Most provinces feed learners five times per week and conform to the minimum number of 156 days per academic calendar year. Eastern Cape, Limpopo and North West deviate from the strict 5 days per week feeding schedule and offer variable feeding days. In these provinces, deviation from the 5 times per week feeding schedule is caused by budgetary constraints. In the Eastern Cape and Limpopo, it would appear that the 5 days per week feeding schedules are normally available at the beginning of each financial year. However, such schedules are modified in later parts of the year, although communities are notified right from the start about future changes to the feeding schedule.

In 2004/05, two provinces, namely Free State (186 days) and the Western Cape (170 days) provided more feeding days than the prescribed minimum of 156 days. Gauteng was the only province that fed learners over a lower number of days (142 days). In 2005/06, projections of the total number of feeding days suggest that three provinces (Free State, Gauteng, and Western Cape) have planned to feed learners over a period that exceeds the minimum required number of feeding days. The fact that most provinces stick to the minimum number of feeding days is an indication of the tightness of funds in a context where increasing demands will be made upon their school nutrition budgets.

Summary remarks about the efficiency and effectiveness of the school nutrition programme, 1995/96 to 2005/06

We identify six main points from the review of the efficiency and effectiveness of spending on the school nutrition programme between the period 1995/96 to 2004/05:

- Under the supervision of the Department of Health, the school nutrition programme was subjected to real declines since its inception. Discounting under-expenditure, spending on the school nutrition programme recovered only after 2001. The declines are not due to better targeting or efficiency gains, but reflect poor funding prioritisation of a very important public policy.
- Highly variable and inefficient actual spending patterns characterised the programme between its inception and 2001/02. This directly reduced the overall effectiveness of the programme in serving poor learner communities.
- The absolute number of participating schools decreased by approximately 3100 between 1995/96 and 2003/04, which represents a 15.4 per cent decline. When the number of targeted schools did increase, the margin was small and indicated an increase from 16 200 schools in 2000/01 to 17 000 in 2003/04.
- Learner participation dropped from 6.8 million learners in 1995/96 to approximately 4.8 million learners in 2003, which represents a reduction of 29 per cent.
- High expenditure ratios in 2004/05 appear to reflect growth in beneficiary numbers, which is partly the result of inherited targeting inefficiencies and partly due to revisions to inherited databases by provincial education departments.
- Differences in targeting practices between education and health prior to 2004/05 caused the same primary school to be treated differently by health and education poverty targeting strategies. This weakened the overall impact of redress spending and reflected poor inter-departmental communication and co-operation.

SECTION 4: CONCLUDING REMARKS

The school nutrition programme can rightly be regarded as a “survivor.” Its roots are traced back to the inception of the new democratic government in 1994 and it is now guaranteed a public financial life beyond 2008/09. This remarkable longevity hides the important story of a bruised public programme, which for the moment, appears to undergo rehabilitation under the supervision of the Department of Education.

The vital question about the conceptual and classificatory status of the school nutrition programme appears to have been settled. This had not always been the case because at its inception, there were strong reservations about a school feeding programme that carried the name "school nutrition programme." Researchers felt that the primary school nutrition programme was using scarce State resources and its stand-alone status as a feeding programme could not be justified. Crucial interventions such as mass de-worming medication, the delivery of micronutrients, control of parasitic worm infections, family planning, life skills, and education aimed at

reducing tobacco and alcohol use were squeezed out by the expensive and logistically intractable school feeding programme. Researchers continued to resist calling the school nutrition programme a "comprehensive nutrition" programme and its designation as an exclusively school feeding programme was conceptually complete in the post-2000 period. The food inflation crisis of 2002 and Cabinet's strong focus on anti-poverty programmes brought the school nutrition programme under the ambit of anti-poverty programmes. In a rigorous way, none of the costs and policy objections that were raised against the school nutrition programme had become invalid. However, the definition of the school nutrition programme as an anti-poverty programme removes some of the reasons that would have restricted school feeding and made narrower targeting the modus operandi. Broad based affirmation of poor learners has now become a necessity, in spite of the limitations of the State's overall anti-poverty programmes. The relatively large real increases in spending on the school nutrition programme over the present MTEF confirm the status of the programme as an anti-poverty measure.

So what were the public finance contexts that the school nutrition programme had to navigate and how was it affected by each of these contexts? We reviewed three public finance contexts, namely the period immediately after the 1994 elections, the period between 1996 and 2000, and the present MTEF (2004-2007). The immediate challenges following the national elections in 1994 were two-fold: the State had to provide greater opportunities to the historically marginalised, while simultaneously dealing with the public finance excesses of the previous regime. Key to the successful transition was the re-prioritisation of public expenditure away from consumption expenditure to development and capital expenditure. This requirement made it difficult, if not impossible, to start new projects by increasing existing staff levels. These developments were the roots of the present conditional grant framework, which does not conceptualise additional staff as a necessary condition for the successful implementation of grant funding projects. Scarce human talent was therefore over-committed and locked into programmes whose challenges were not clearly understood at the outset. Added to this staff burden was the extension of the principle of "no real growth" in funding for earmarked projects. For the school nutrition programme, the net effect of these actions was a significant drop in the total number of participating schools and learners. It was only poor actual expenditure that prevented a full-scale exposure of the inadequacies of this programme.

The school nutrition programme's next destination was its integration into the Department of Health's integrated nutrition strategy. This period lasted from 1998/99 to 2003/04 and included two distinct phases in the evolution of public finances in South Africa. The phase that ran from 1996 to 2000 was characterised by government's macro-economic strategy (Gear) informing fiscal policy and budget policy. Gear's main influence was on moderating social services' spending on the national purse. The post-2000 phase saw a mild expansionary fiscal stance adopted by the South African government. While real reductions to the school nutrition allocations for the period 1996-2000 are unsurprising, we were surprised by the results of the real growth after 2000. Consistent with social service programmes' reductions in the 1996-2000 period, the school nutrition programme was reduced in real average annual terms by 9.7 per cent, while actual

expenditure decreased by 3.9 per cent over the same period. The reason for the smaller real loss in actual expenditure is because of variable spending patterns during this period. Although the real average annual growth rate between 2000 and 2003 was positive (10.3%), this was mainly due to the large increase in the allocation in 2003 (38%). For all the other years in this period, budgeted school nutrition programme funding continued to shed real resources. This was in sharp contrast to consolidated provincial health spending, which appeared to have recovered well after 2000. Higher wage costs in provincial health are given as one of the main reasons why the school nutrition allocation and the integrated nutrition allocation as a whole did not benefit.

The third destination of the school nutrition programme was its location as a national conditional grant under the supervision of the Department of Education. The education sector took over funding and supervisory responsibility in 2004/05, and its inheritance was marked by two features: school nutrition allocations that were declining in real value since its inception, and a conditional grant framework that was much more enabling in promoting effective and efficient implementation. The school nutrition programme will change in two important ways. The first relates to its insertion in education budgets that have grown slowly, but consistently, in the post-2000 period. We have argued that this consistent growth was targeted at meeting a policy framework that allowed activities and expenditure categories of relatively small magnitude to grow in real terms. The school nutrition programme fits the bill and is projected to grow by a real average annual rate of 6.4 per cent over the 2004 to 2007 period. It would appear that the funding neglect that this programme suffered under the supervision of the Department of Health is set to come to an end.

The second change relates to the total number of schools and learners that are earmarked to benefit from this programme. We showed how faced with real reductions in resources, the school nutrition programme in its earlier guises suffered blows in terms of the reduction of participating schools and learners. Now, with real average annual growth rates guaranteed, and targeting processes re-visited, the total number of schools and learners across provinces is projected to increase. However, the re-definition of poor learners according to national poverty quintiles has different implications for rich and poor provinces. In the case of the latter, larger number of poor learners would define the poorest of the poor and this would increase the funding costs for poor provinces. Rich provinces would have fewer learners in the poorest brackets and would have more space to target a diversity of poor learners. If we add the directive from the national Department of Education that no participating schools inherited from the Department of Health lists should be removed, then it is easy to understand why Limpopo spent 127 per cent of its original allocation in 20004/05. We predicted that the next few years will be used to finalise beneficiary numbers and this raises important questions about the adequacy of present allocations and the need for additional funding from provincial education departments.

In assessing the overall efficiency of spending, we found that the school nutrition programme exhibited highly variable spending levels from its inception until the end of 2001. In addition, real levels of spending on this programme showed a consistent negative decline since its inception. It was

only at the start of the 2003/04 financial year that spending recovered and grew progressively since then. The combination of variable actual spending and low funding priority had a negative impact on overall service delivery and quality. It was not the case that the "little" had been spent well, but it was rather that the barest little could not be spent with all the other accompanying service delivery problems. We linked poor financial servicing of the school nutrition programme to declining number of participating schools and learners. Similar to the patterns on the financial allocations, the total number of participating schools and learners only started growing again in the post-2000 period. In addition, this growth was relatively small compared to the reductions in the number of schools and learners in earlier periods. We rejected interpretations that suggest that decreases in the size of the school nutrition budget and total number of schools and learners reflect increasingly effective targeting strategies. In fact, we critically analysed the targeting data and found many inefficiencies.

Arguably, the most telling story from the time when the Department of Health had supervisory responsibility for the school nutrition programme concerns the complete negation of the school funding norms. While the school funding norms were only introduced in 2000, it nonetheless started a process (flawed as it was), of identifying the most needy schools. However, provincial health targeting proceeded without knowledge of the school funding norms and the same can be said about provincial education planners' ignorance of health targeting strategies. This led to a situation where a dual targeting strategy did not necessarily identify the same schools and learners as "needy." Ideally speaking, a school where learners are fed should also have been part of the poorest poverty quintiles. These two types of spending are complementary and the fact that the two targeting systems did not always identify the same schools as poor reduced the effectiveness of spending on anti-poverty programmes. Targeting was further compromised because of the diversity of targeting strategies and the fact that some of these strategies produced socially undesirable consequences.

The inefficiency of the old targeting system is only now being addressed because provincial education departments found many schools that were incorrectly classified or databases that were outdated. This revision produces spending consequences that are not always within the reach of provincial education departments. In the first year of the school nutrition programme's operation under the command of the Department of Education, provincial education departments managed to spend 99.0 per cent of their original allocations. This is an extremely high expenditure spending ratio and in the case of Limpopo, this ratio stood at 127 per cent. This was indicative of a process of re-visiting databases and increasing the number of schools and learners. In some cases, the programme would simply be extended to more learners in the same schools, but the net effect is an enlargement of the funding commitments of provinces. Our examination of provincial education funding discretionary bases showed that most education departments do not have the wherewithal to finance a rapid expansion of learner numbers. This suggests that the overall envelope of the school nutrition programme needs to be increased or provinces have to brace themselves for continued over-spending of conditional grant funding.

So how does the story of the school nutrition programme continue? The immediate future of the school nutrition programme is strongly related to the re-designing of the school funding norms. Delays in the legislation process concerning the school funding norms presently prevent the full-blown re-definition of the school nutrition programme from a grade-level focus towards a broad anti-poverty focus. However, even if new school funding norms legislation can be enacted, concerns remain about the possible fragmentation of implementation across provinces. This suggests a serious re-think about how changes in school funding legislation deepen existing implementation fault lines.

NOTES

[i] We would like to thank Ms Debbie Budlender, a senior researcher with the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE), for her thorough review of the first draft version of this paper. We would also like to thank the nine provincial co-ordinators for the valuable information they provided. We relied a lot on their assistance in completing information on key tables and graphs.

[ii] Russell Wildeman is an Education Specialist with the Budget Information Service (Idasa) and Nobuntu Mbebetho is a Research Assistant with the same organisation.

[iii] In the Cabinet briefing that signalled the handover of school nutrition from the health to the education sector, the Cabinet statement read: "Cabinet was briefed on a thorough review of the Primary School Nutrition Programme and welcomed progress that has been made **in ensuring food security** among primary school children in poor communities. In order to further improve efficiency in the Programme, Cabinet decided as follows:

- the primary target of school feeding should also include Grade R learners in targeted primary schools;
- funding for the Programme should be increased annually in a phased manner to cover all areas in need, in accordance with standardised menu options;
- the programme should be transferred from the Department of Health to the Department of Education by April 2004 given the Programme's educational outcomes and the fact that the Department is functionally responsible for schools; and
- work should continue to improve the efficiency of the Programme, including standardised menu options and monitoring system as well as increased involvement of School Governing Bodies and women's groups" (*Cabinet Statement, 18 September 2002, our own emphasis*).

Furthermore, in response to the Congress of South African Trade Unions' section 77 notices regarding job losses, poverty and restructuring of State assets, Cabinet responded: "The consolidation and extension of the School Nutritional Programme is itself a concrete demonstration of the Government's preoccupation with the issues affecting the standard of living of our citizens" (*Cabinet Statement, 20 September 2002*).

[iv] Arguably, the strongest review of the primary school nutrition programme had been carried out by the Child Health Unit at the University of Cape Town. The strength of their report concerns the willingness to identify *both policy benefits and policy costs* and then arguing the case for the retention or rejection of the programme. The unit was extremely critical of the school nutrition programme as an imposed feeding programme and for its inability to find resources for what these researchers considered "vital" activities. The counter to a vertically imposed feeding programme is: "As part of the Integrated Nutrition Programme, the PSNP **should become** a spring-board for the development of community-based nutrition programmes. Given the number and distribution of schools (many more than health facilities), and given the promotion of parental involvement in schools (as part of the South African Schools Act), **a transformed PSNP** could become a foundation and channel for the development of **community-based nutrition activities**" (Child Health Unit, 1997: 89, our own emphasis).

[v] Our approach to the research of key areas in education funding is to keep our arguments as simple as possible. This leads us to minimise complicated linkages and networks of the education sector with other social sectors. We regard the task of understanding education-specific funding issues as demanding and through our research, we are hoping to develop a better handle on the main issues. It is only then that we would be able to maximally extend our analyses to other areas and integrate education concerns more successfully with other social service and service delivery concerns. This leaves us open to a charge of "minimalism", but we defend this position by regarding this paper as a first instalment/engagement with the issues that defined the school nutrition programme.

[vi] The evidence cited in the Louw et al. (2001) study is exclusively oriented towards supporting the usefulness and efficacy of school feeding schemes. No evidence is reported concerning studies that cast doubt about the effectiveness and efficiency of school feeding schemes. This is unlike the Child Health Unit (1997) study that considered both sides of the debate.

[vii] Consistent pressure from civil society and the African National Congress (ANC) led to a series of review documents concerning the funding of public schools. At the heart of these debates was a concern that poor learners were defined differently across provinces in spite of similar placement in poverty quintiles. The proposed policy that attempts to remedy these defects does not enact funding prescriptions from the Department of Education but merely proposes various "adequacy benchmarks." These benchmarks are figures provided by the Department of Education but have as yet not been properly unpacked by government or civil society. These changes are proposed in *Government Notice No 26911 of 2004: Call for Comment on the Education Laws Amendment Bill, 2004.* See also, "*Funding of schools: Policy issues and proposed amendments to the Norms and Standards*", a presentation to the portfolio committee on education, National Assembly, October 2004.

[viii] In the present MTEF (2004-2007), the school nutrition allocation is projected to grow by 6.4 per cent in real average annual terms. The *Division of Revenue Bill 2004* reflects on the significance of the school nutrition in the following manner: "The Primary School Nutrition Programme is a government programme for poverty alleviation specifically initiated **to uphold the rights of children to basic food**. For this reason, there is a national mandate to fund, spend and account transparently before government and the public" (our emphasis). And on the life span of the grant "It is envisaged that, given the economic climate in the country and the impact of HIV and AIDS, the need for such a grant will persist for another 8 to 10 years at least."

[ix] Section 2 of the *Reconstruction and Development Programme Fund Act of 1994* establishes the various sources of the RDP Programme Fund: " There is hereby established a fund to be known as the Reconstruction and Development Programme Fund, which shall be credited with-

(a) money appropriated by Parliament for the fund;

(b) domestic and foreign grants;

(c) interest derived from the investment of money standing to the credit of the fund;

(d) the proceeds derived from the sale of state assets for the reconstruction and development projects and programmes referred to in section 3; and

(e) money accruing to the fund from any other source."

[x] From the evidence that we collected from earlier research projects, it became clear that the availability of staff to implement conditional grant funding at the sub-national level appears to be one of the main factors explaining actual expenditure ratios. We are only referring to the implementation of this grant and have not even looked at the cost of monitoring and evaluation. The latter has become crucial in the policy discourse after the 1999 national elections.

[xi] Over the 1997/98 to 2001/02 period, consolidated provincial education budgets decreased at a real average annual rate of approximately 2.0 per cent, while health budgets actually increased by 0.2 per cent over the same period. What makes the decline in education spending so pronounced was that total provincial spending declined by 0.7 per cent on average compared to an average decline of 2.0 per cent in consolidated education. Sources consulted were National Treasury's *Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2001 and 2003.*

[xii] MINMECs are institutional forums in the budget process, which consist of the national minister in a portfolio and his/her nine MECs (member of the Executive Councils in provincial government). Policy and policy co-ordination issues are discussed and the overall purpose of this forum is to drive political consensus on the most important funding and implementation challenges facing the sector.

[xiii] The *Division of Revenue Bill 2001 (DOR Bill)* institutionalised most of the discussions, debates and improvements that were driven in the Budget Council and other budget institutions. In the *DOR Bill 2001,* an entire section was dedicated to explaining a framework for all grants and the specific criteria that were to define grant funding in future. Unlike the *Division of Revenue Bill 1998,* the 2001 version specifically requested that the following criteria be included in the consideration of grant funding: The purpose and conditions of such allocations; the measurable outputs; reasons why the purpose of the grant cannot be achieved through the equitable grant funding system; the projected life span of the grant; the criteria that would guide the division of such allocations at the sub-national level; and the recommended payment schedule.

[xiv] In section 3 (1) of the *South African Schools Act, No 84 of 1996,* the definition of compulsory attendance is defined as: "Subject to this Act and any applicable provincial law, every parent must cause very learner for whom he or she is responsible to attend a school from the first school day of the year in which such learner reaches the age of seven years until the last school day of the year in which such learner reaches the age of fifteen years or the ninth grade, whichever occurs first." Although the *National Norms and Standards for School Funding* re-affirm these distinctions in section 19, it appears to contradict these in section 44, which states "An important assumption underlying these national norms is that the national and provincial levels of government will honour the State's duty, in terms of the Constitution and the SASA, to progressively provide resources to safeguard the right to education of all South Africans. However, educational needs are always greater than the budgetary provision for education. To effect redress and improve equity, public spending on schools must be **specifically targeted to the needs of the poor. This will apply to both the General Education (grades 1-9) and the Further Education and Training (grades 10-12) phases**" (Our emphasis).

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APPENDIX A: WRITTEN CORRESPONDENCE WITH PROVINCIAL CO-ORDINATORS OF THE SCHOOL NUTRITION PROGRAMME

Eastern Cape - Dr E. Fray, Acting Chief Director: Specialized Education Services

Free State – Mr. H. R Khosa, Director: Learner Support

Gauteng – Ms. N. Rakwena, Project Manager: NSNP

KZN – Mr. N Mpanza, Director: Education; Dr. L.T Mbatha, Chief Director: Curriculum Planning & Support; and Mr. M. Kubeka, Acting Manager: NSNP

Limpopo – Mr. M. Zitha, Provincial Manager: NSNP

Mpumalanga: Mr. J. Moya, Chief Education Specialist: NSNP

Northern Cape: Mr. B. Jacobs, Provincial Coordinator: NSNP

North West: Mr. K. I. Mpshe, Chief Education Specialist

Western Cape: Mr. D. Matunda, Programme Co-ordinator: NSNP

National Department of Health: Mr Jan Booysen provided important historical spending and output data

National Department of Education: We received a short note from the Department of Education through Ms Buyisiwe Ngidi

APPENDIX B: LIST OF DATA TABLES

Table A1: Table 1: Household expenditure models of food shares

	All food items		Basic food items	
Predictor variables	**Coefficient**	**P-value**	**Coefficient**	**P-value**
ln (household income per capita)	-0.077619	0.000	-0.045139	0.000
Household pension amount	1.520000	0.000	0.869000	0.000
remittance received by household	0.000276	0.995	0.011400	0.674
(household pension amount)Sq	-0.000178	0.000	0.000000	0.000
(remittance received by household) Sq	-0.000001	0.000	0.000000	0.000
years of education attained by the household head	0.368630	0.000	0.080860	0.074

(years of education attained by the household head)Sq	-0.034800	0.000	-0.013520	0.000
child support grant	1.474980	0.002	1.177060	0.000
disability grant	2.495010	0.000	1.252380	0.000
number of children	-1.131300	0.000	-0.531490	0.000
number of adult non-eligible for pension	-0.745570	0.000	-0.441240	0.000
number of male elderly	0.960430	0.038	0.458000	0.119
number of female elderly	-0.902540	0.008	-0.434370	0.043
age of the household head	-0.060260	0.000	-0.046580	0.000
(age of the household head)Sq	0.000057	0.000	0.000042	0.000
female household head	-0.769440	0.001	-0.160630	0.259
black/african	2.567240	0.000	1.985260	0.000
coloured	3.343110	0.000	-0.117260	0.720
indian/asian	0.597420	0.377	-0.653830	0.127
rural	1.571730	0.000	1.438900	0.000
remittance *black	0.000254	0.000	0.000125	0.000
pension amount*black	-0.000303	0.001	-0.000145	0.012
predicted income*black	-0.000200	0.000	-0.000159	0.000
remittance*poverty	-0.000408	0.005	-0.000225	0.015
pension amount *poverty	-0.001340	0.000	-0.000887	0.000
predicted income *poverty	0.002130	0.000	0.001100	0.000
poverty	-1.680700	0.011	-0.826660	0.049
eastern cape	-4.640740	0.000	-0.777930	0.003
northern cape	-2.842830	0.000	-3.008320	0.000
free state	-8.700380	0.000	-4.056780	0.000
kwazulu natal	0.318310	0.418	1.424990	0.000
north west	-5.475550	0.000	-3.015200	0.000
gauteng	-2.145050	0.000	-0.588320	0.017
mpumalanga	-5.370670	0.000	-2.754130	0.000
limpopo	-5.527330	0.000	-1.530720	0.000
Constant term	102.332300	0.000	59.111780	0.000

Source: Economic Policy Research Institute (2004: 78)

Table A2: Actual expenditure as a percentage of budgeted expenditure on the school nutrition programme by provincial education department, 2004/05

Province	Total available (R thousand)	Total spent (R thousand)	Spent as a % of total available
Eastern Cape	177259	170910	96.4%
Free State	49100	46149	94.0%
Gauteng	75730	75148	99.2%
KwaZulu-Natal	181420	148459	81.8%
Limpopo	153125	194672	127.1%
Mpumalanga	64079	62696	97.8%

Northern Cape	22469	21440	95.4%
North West	72401	64150	88.6%
Western Cape	36617	36191	98.8%
Total	**832200**	**819815**	**98.5%**

Source: Personal communication with the national Department of Education 2005

Table A3: Estimated cost per learner in 2004/05 and 2005/06 by provincial education department

Province	Estimated cost per learner, 2004/05	Estimated total cost in 2004/05	Estimated cost per learner, 2005/06	Estimated total cost in 2005/06
Eastern Cape	R 1.11	R164 850 870	R1.16	R181 036 365
Free State	R 1.50	N/A	R1.50	R50 000 000
Gauteng	R 1.10	R357 539,60	R1.10	440 952.60
KwaZulu Natal	R 0.90	R187. 9 million	R0.90	R213. 5 million
Limpopo	R 1.00	R176 million	R1.10c	R207 million
Mpumalanga	R 0.83	R69,079,000.00	R0.91	R70,235,000.00
Northern Cape	R 1.00 - feeding R0, 15 - admin	R18, 876, 000 for feeding only	R1.00	R19, 413, 576
North West	R1.50-Urban R1.30-Rural	995 88590.4	R2.34	R891180
Western Cape	R 1.13	R33 503 817.609	R1.24	R40 135 000

Source: Personal communication with provincial education departments in 2004 and 2005

Note: we could not verify the exact interpretation of the estimated total cost in 2004/05 and 2005/06 and made a decision to omit this table from the main text. However, for completeness of information sake, we include it in the appendix.

Table A4: Total number of school targeted and number of schools reached as a proportion of targets, 1994/95 to 2003/04

Financial Year	Targeted	Reached	Proportion reached
1994/95	15 911	13 167	0.83
1995/96	20 110	15 894	0.79
1996/97	17 025	13 061	0.77
1997/98	17 945	14 549	0.81
1998/99	17 500	15 776	0.90
1999/2000	16 087	15 428	0.96
2000/01	16 200	15 600	0.96
2001/02	16 600	16 000	0.96
2002/03	17 000	16 107	0.95
2003/04	17 000	16 200	0.95

Source: Personal communication with Departments of Health and Education in 2004 and 2005

Table A5: Total number of learners targeted and number of learners reached as a proportion of targets, 1994/95 to 2004/05

Financial Year	Targeted	Reached	Proportion reached
1994/95	6 29 3000	5 62 8000	0.89